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by Marsha Morrow McLaughlin and Suzanne Vaupel**
I. The Problem
A. Introduction
Mr. X was on his way to a promising career in sales. He was
hired by a large manufacturing firm after he scored higher than anyone
had ever scored on the battery of intelligence and aptitude tests. His
good recommendations and successful interview had assured him suc-
cess. Suddenly everything turned sour. His manager asked him re-
peatedly "Why don't you come clean?" and began expressing obvious
lack of confidence in Mr. X's character. After several months of pres-
sure, Mr. X resigned. He was interviewed at numerous other large
companies and was always told he was a fine candidate and would
probably be hired. But the offers never came. After six years, Mr.
X discovered a preemployment report on himself in the files of a con-
sumer investigating agency. The report stated that he had been dis-
honorably discharged from the army and that six years earlier he had
hosted a wild party and had verbally abused an elderly lady who had
complained about the noise. In reality, Mr. X had received an honor-
able discharge. The elderly lady whom he was supposed to have
abused lived in the apartment directly beneath him and was a known
crank. She had often made unreasonable demands, insisting one time
that Mr. X and his wife keep their shoes off when in their own apart-
ment.1
Mr. X had been a victim of adverse decisions based on false in-
formation in an investigative consumer report.2 These reports are
* "'Little Brother' is the hard-to-reach private organization that determines
whether or not you are a good retail credit risk." Safire, Three Brothers (essay), N.Y.
Times, Jan. 10, 1974, at 37, col. 5.
** Members, second year class.
1. Hearings on H.R. 16340 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 78-81 (1970).
2. "The term 'investigative consumer report' means a consumer report or portion
thereof in which information on a consumer's character, general reputation, personal
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often part of a routine investigation of an applicant's reliability for
credit, insurance or employment, and they involve personal information
which is often inaccurate or irrelevant to the purposes for which the re-
ports are made. These reports, like the less damaging consumer re-
ports,' are made by consumer reporting agencies. In order to make
informed decisions, businesses have become increasingly dependent on
their services. Consumer reporting has emerged as a multimillion
dollar industry with files on a vast number of Americans.4
This note will focus on investigative consumer reports as an in-
vasion of the constitutional right of privacy. Part H will discuss judi-
cial remedies for the resulting harm. Part Ill will evaluate existing
legislative controls and will propose principles necessary to prevent the
privacy-invading aspects of investigative consumer reports.
B. Privacy and "Information Prisons"
The concept of privacy has been considered at great length in
characteristics or mode of living is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors,
friends, or associates of the consumer reported on or with others with whom he is ac-
quainted or who may have knowledge concerning any such items of information:' Fair
Credit Reporting Act § 1681a(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 15
U.S.C. § 1681].
3. "The term 'consumer report' means any written, oral, or other communication
of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal char-
acteristics, or mode of living. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).
4. OPERATING STATISTICS FOR 5 LARGE INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING FIRMS
Total Num-
ber of inves- Consumer
Number tijative Insurance Credit Employment Inspector interviews
of files, reports, reports, reports, reports, man-years, since
Company 1972 1972 1972 1972 1972 1972 April 1971
Retail Credit 46,000,000 13,731,049 12,537,328 152,437 1,041.284 (1) 135,662
Service Review 50,000 3,396,812 3,375,889 (2) 20,923 738 (1)
Hooper-Holmes 2,500.000 1,443,661 1.368,439 25,734 49.488 361 5,708
O'Hanlon 4,000,000 492,298 492,298 (2) (2) (1) 1,29
American Service
Bureau 1,970,000 784,379 781,241 (2) 3,138 1,160 980
Total 54,520,000 19,848,199 18,555,195 178,171 1,114,833
± Not available.Negligible.
Source: Data submitted to Subcommittee on Consumer Credit by each firm.
Hearings on S.2360 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of thc Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 886 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as 1973 Proxmire Hearings].
Retail Credit Company [hereinafter Retail Credit], the largest of these firms,
claims to make 35 million reports each year. Retail Credit employs more than 11,300
full-time salaried people, in more than 2,000 localities across the continent. Retail Credit
Company, What We Do & Do Not Do, Form 15869, June, 1972.
The total value of Retail Credit has been estimated to be $40 million. Yearly
profits are about $9 million. Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 937,
119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1975).
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philosophical, psychological and sociological contexts. Professor
Charles Fried of Yale has defined privacy as "the necessary context for
relationships which we would hardly be human if we had to do without
-the relationships of love, friendship and trust."5  Privacy is not
simply the hiding of unsavory facts about one's self; "rather it is the
control we have over information about ourselves."'6  If that control is
taken away, the individual loses a significant aspect of his or her hu-
manity. Privacy, therefore, is an essential sociological phenomenon
which allows a person to explore himself, let down his defenses and
express his innermost feelings.
The twentieth century has seen individual privacy increasingly
abused by modem information-gathering techniques, of which wiretaps,
bugging devices and the polygraph are only a few. Additionally, the
computer now can be used to file and store great quantities of data.
While the gathering of separate facts can be annoying, information
systems which collect unrelated and seemingly insignificant facts are
more serious invasions of privacy." Senator Sam Ervin referred to in-
formation systems as "'information prisons' in which the individual is
forever contsrained by his past words and actions."'  Justice Douglas
graphically described this increasing governmental use of personal in-
formation files:
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is
open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from
5. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475, 484 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Fried]. See
also, A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 40-53 (1st ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
MILLER]; A. WESTN, PRIvAcY AND FREEDOM 8-63 (1st ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
WEsrTN]; Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bloustein].
6. Fried, supra, note 5, at 482.
7. It will soon be technically feasible to store a twenty page dossier on every sin-
gle American on a piece of tape less than 5,000 feet long. 120 CoNG. REC. S1296
(daily ed. Feb. 5, 1974) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
Retail Credit bragged of the centralization of its credit bureau computer functions.
"Now a customer, regardless of location can secure information in about 2k sec-
onds." Retail Credit Company Management Newsletter, Sept. 1971. See also MILLER,
supra note 5, at 83-105.
8. "The maxim that 'knowledge is power' takes on new meaning in an age of com-
puters. Data banks of personal information bestow on youthful indiscretions an embar-
rassing permanence.. . ." 106 SCIENCE NEWS 296 (1974). See generally MILLER and
WESTIN, supra note 5. A survey of fifty federal agencies revealed the existence of 750
databanks of personal files. The Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) reported the
existence of what Senator Ervin termed "the ultimate in governmental data banks." This
databank contains files on approximate 5,000 individuals. Short of emergency circum-
stances however, the OEP does not have access to the databank, nor does it know what
information is contained therein. The databank is utilized and kept current by au-
thorized specialists in the Personnel Operation staff of the White House. 119 CoNG.
REc. S15471 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1973) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
9. Id. at S15472. I
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government. The aggressive breaches of privacy by the Govern-
ment increase by geometric proportions. Wiretapping and "bug-
ging" run rampant, without effective judicial or legislative control.
... The dossiers on all citizens mount in number and in-
crease in size. Now they are being put on computers so that by
pressing one button all the miserable, the sick, the suspect, the un-
popular, the offbeat people of the Nation can be instantly identi-
fied. . . . These examples and many others demonstrate an
alarming trend whereby the privacy and dignity of our citizens is
being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken in-
dividually, each step may be of little consequence. But when
viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society quite unlike
any we have seen-a society in which government may intrude
into the secret regions of man's life at will.10
The private sector also collects and maintains pervasive personal
information systems. One writer described the personnel practices of
government and large-scale corporate enterprises as "contemporary
tendencies in the direction of stripping the individual naked of his
human dignity by exposing his personal life to public scrutiny.""
C. Abuses of Investigative Credit Reporting
Of all the personal information systems being kept, the files of
credit bureaus are among the most potentially harmful, since decisions
based on this information control nearly every aspect of a person's eco-
nomic activity.
Credit reports fall into two categories: the file operation and the
investigative operation.'" File operations are limited to factual infor-
mation easily subject to verification, such as name, residence, employ-
ment, financial and public record data.' 3 Investigative operations sup-
ply this hard data, but their reports also contain subjective information
concerning the applicant's character, general reputation, mode of living
and associates. This information is obtained from neighborhood
checks and personal interviews with neighbors, friends. associates and
others who may have information on the applicant. Investigative re-
ports consist of value judgments and interpretations of the tenor of the
interview, the type of neighborhood in which the applicant resides and
10. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341-43 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
11. Bloustein, supra note 5, at 1006.
12. 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 4, at 956.
13. The vast majority of credit reporting agencies are file operators. John Spaf-
ford, president of Associated Credit Bureaus, testified that 98% of the members of
A.C.B. are strictly concerned with credit reporting. Hearings on S.823 Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., at 162 (1969).
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the condition of his home. Users of these reports, chiefly insurance
companies, employers and landlords, request that investigative reports
contain as much personal information as possible. One individual who
has studied the consumer reporting industry concluded that:
[Tihe need for character, habits, morals information-reputational
information-has not been established by any systematic study of
the situation ....
They work on sort of a Gestalt theory that the more informa-
tion they have about an individual, the better able they will be to
rate that individual in terms of the risk he presents to the com-
pany .... 14
The subjectivity of these reports leaves them peculiarly vulnerable to
error and misinterpretation.
During the 1960's, concern over abusive credit reporting prac-
tices developed. When industry self-regulation failed to correct the
abuses, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (hereinafter FCRA)15 was
passed. The act, which went into effect in April, 1971, attempted to
curb abusive practices by the credit reporting industry without infring-
ing upon its ability to satisfy the legitimate needs of business for infor-
mation.
Despite the passage of the FCRA, there is strong evidence that
abusive practices continue. Inaccurate information continues to find
its way into credit bureau files.16 Although human fallibility is in part
responsible for these inaccuracies, the problem is magnified by hiring
practices' 7 and by credit industry policies emphasizing quantity of pro-
duction over quality of reports, and encouraging the development of ad-
verse information. The Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter FTC]
has filed a complaint against Retail Credit,' 8 in which some of these
14. 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 4, at 678 (testimony of Albert Foer).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
16. In fact, credit bureaus' standard forms disclaim accuracy. For example, the
standard contract form for Retail Credit Company states: "Recognizing that informa-
tion is secured by and through fallible human sources and that for the fee charged you
cannot be an insuror of the accuracy of the information ... we release you and your
affiliated companies . . . from liability for any negligence in connection with the prep-
aration of such reports. . . ." Retail Credit Company public relations material, Helping
Business Serve Consumers, "Agreement for Service" (last page), Form 15956 October,
1974.
17. Advertisements for investigators indicate that to qualify an individual need
only have a high school diploma and a car. E.g., Miami Herald, June 11, 1974, at 18-
E; Miami Herald, Apr. 15, 1971, at 19-C; Washington Post, Mar. 25, 1971, at K-4.
18. Complaint, In Re Retail Credit Co., No. 8954 (F.T.C., Feb. 21, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as FTC Complaint against Retail Credit Co.]. For a summary of
FTC activities in enforcing FCRA, and the problems that have arisen, see Feldman, The
Fair Credit Reporting Act-From the Regulators Vantage Point, 14 SANTA CLARA LAw.
459 (1974).
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abuses are detailed. An overview of these abuses follows.
1. Unrealistic Production Goals
Four former investigators for Retail Credit Company testified be-
fore a Senate subcommittee that they had been required to meet re-
porting goals of eighteen to twenty-two reports per day. If an inspec-
tor does not meet his quota for three months running, he is dismissed.
Additionally, an investigator's salary is based upon his production.
Bonuses are granted for surpassing the production quota.19
Witnesses testified that it is not possible to meet production goals
over a period of time and still comply with procedures outlined in the
company manual. They estimated that only eight to twelve cases a day
could be completed if investigators were to follow prescribed pro-
cedures. 20
The pressure to meet high production goals forces investigators
to develop shortcuts, of which a variety exist. They include extensive
use of the telephone for interviewing rather than personal contacts,21
listing sources not actually contacted, 22 and not asking certain ques-
tions or asking them in such a way as to elicit a negative reply in order
to avoid prolonging the interview.2 3  The word "zinging" has been
coined by investigators to refer to some shortcuts. It includes using
material from an older file on the subject, filling in information from
that given by insurers and completing the form by guessing. 4
19. Hearings on Amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act Bc fore the Subcomm.
on Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 4, 8, 22, 39, 40, 41 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Proxmire
Hearings]. Former investigator, William F. Boaz, testified, "I ha e been told by the
manager, length of service with Retail Credit Co. means nothing, you will maintain the
required volume of cases, you will meet company standards regarding protective and de-
cline cases or you will get another job." Id. at 3.
The part-time employee is paid on a straight percentage basis. The full-time em-
ployee is paid a salary, however his production must account for his salary and leave
a specified percentage of net profit to the company. As a result, whenever a salaried
employee is granted a raise, the number of daily reports which he must complete in-
creases. Id. at 16-17.
FTC alleges that Retail Credit's maintenance of a salary/production system consti-
tutes a violation of the FCRA requirement that it establish procedures to assure the max-
imum possible accuracy of information. FTC Complaint against Retail Credit Co., su-
pra note 18, at 9-10.
20. 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 22, 40.
21. Id. at 40. See also FTC Complaint against Retail Credit Co., supra note 18,
at 10.
22. 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 19-20. See also FrC complaint
against Retail Credit Co., supra note 18, at 10.
23. 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 40.
24. One investigator defined "zinging" as follows: "A 'zing' means you do nothing,
you do not contact the investigatee. One does not go out on the streets and investigate
[Vol. 2
The "crystal ball system" is another type of shortcut used by inves-
tigators to meet daily production goals. This entails simply looking at
an inquiry to determine if the individual "looks OK," and then dictat-
ing the report. 25  Finally, investigators resort to pretext as a means of
maintaining volume.26 The company manual, for example, recom-
mends the use of the "indirect interview," and suggests that investiga-
tors identify themselves as employees of the customer rather than of
Retail Credit.27
2. Quolas on Adverse Information
The former investigators also testified that they had been required
to produce a certain percentage of reports containing adverse informa-
tion.28 Adverse information is emphasized because it is regarded by
insurance companies as an indication of the thoroughness of the inves-
tigative reporting company. 29 The investigators stated that Retail
Credit requires declinable ° information in approximately 10 percent
of all investigations. In addition, Retail requires 50 to 60 percent
of all reports to contain protective information.8' Each investigator is
required to fill out a daily Form 930, on which he lists the number
of cases he has investigated and the percentage of these which include
declinable and protective information. This report is reviewed weekly
to determine if the investigator is meeting his quotas. Failure to meet
the report. He utilizes whatever information was supplied by the insurance company
and hopefully looks up the insured in the phone book to assure that he lives there: then
you just fill in the form, which is mostly boxes that one checks off yes or no.
'"The entire report would be faked." Id. at 11.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 23.
27. Id. at 26. The FTC complaint against Retail Credit alleges misrepresentation
by the company's investigative personnel. Allegedly the investigators misrepresent that:
(1) They are agents of the company to which the consumer has applied for
a benefit, and
(2) certain investigations are "routine credit checks," when the actual purpose
is to evaluate the validity of the consumer's claim under an existing insurance
policy.
FTC complaint against Retail Credit Co., supra note 18, at 4-5.
28. 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 3, 5, 17, 39, 40. See also FrC
complaint against Retail Credit Co., supra note 18, at 9.
29. 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 18.
30. Information which is sufficiently derogatory to cause an insurance company to
deny an application for insurance. Id. at 4.
31. 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 5. Protective information is in-
formation which would be of value to the insurance company, but is not bad enough
to cause them to decline the subject. A company manual sets forth the guidelines for
determining what kinds of information constitute declinable and protective information.
Id. at 42.
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quotas leads to probation and ultimately to dismissal."2  In addition,
each Retail Credit office maintains statistics on the percentage of ad-
verse information contained in reports by its investigators. The dif-
ferent offices compete with one another as to which can maintain the
highest level of protective and declinable information.33
The emphasis on filling quotas forces investigators to lay greater
stress on adverse information than on accurate information. A variety
of techniques is used to develop negative data. Adverse information
in old files is copied without reconfirmation.34 Persons interviewed
are baited with leading questions3" and often inspectors neglect to
verify adverse information through a second source. 6 Frequently ir-
relevant negative information is entered in files in order to maintain
protective information percentages. 37
The emphasis on adverse information over accurate information
is also apparent in Retail Credit Company's policy regarding reinvesti-
gations. The FTC charges that Retail Credit does not pay an inspec-
tor for a reinvestigation if it reveals that he failed to discover an item
of adverse information in the first investigation, or if he is unable to
confirm adverse information contained in the first investigation. 8 As
in their initial investigations, investigators often use shortcuts when re-
investigating reports. For example, they frequently do not seek new
sources in a reinvestigation, but rely on the same sources used in prior
investigations.3 9
32. Id. at 5, 17.
33. Id. at 32.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id. at 33.
36. Id. at 20-21. Retail Credit Company promises its customers that each item
of adverse information is verified by at least two sources. The former investigators,
however, estimated the percentage of one-source checks ranges from 50 to 95 percent.
Where the investigator is unable to obtain two sources, he "zings" or makes up a name.
"You just pull them out of the hat ... or if you have the time, look up neighbors in an
address directory." Id. at 19-20.
37. Id. at 26. The FTC alleges that Retail Credit incorporates all information into
the same filing system, making no attempt to segregate consumer report information
from claims report information. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that investigators
misrepresent that information will be used exclusively by the company to which the con-
sumer has applied for a benefit. FTC Complaint against Retail Credit Co., supra note
18, at 7. In actuality, FTC alleges all information, including medical information, is
retained in Retail's files and is used in subsequent reports. Id.
38. The FTC complaint alleges that Retail Credit violates those sections of the
FCRA which require the establishment of procedures to assure the maximum possible
accuracy in that it credits an investigator for reinvestigations only if it is proven that
he was accurate in his initial investigation. Id. at 9.
39. See 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 20.
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3. Inaccurate Public Record Information
Information from public records such as newspapers and court
records is a major source of inaccuracy. Investigators rely heavily on
these records, but due to lack of time and their desire for adverse in-
formation, they do not verify this information.4" Name mixups are a
major problem. Often derogatory public record information is entered
in the file of the wrong person because his name is the same as or
similar to someone else's.41  In addition to outright errors, there are
distortions of fact due to incomplete data. While arrests and the filing
of civil suits are systematically collected by credit agencies, the dismis-
sal of charges or civil suits is not included in credit reports.42 Further-
more, because most consumers are not aware that they are responsible
for updating court records after they have satisfied a judgment against
them, credit bureaus frequently do not have current information on the
status of judgments.43
4. Evasion of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
The FCRA has established important consumer rights regarding
credit reports,44 but its effectiveness in curbing abuses is highly ques-
tionable. Former investigators testified that the FCRA has had minimal
impact on the credit reporting industry.45
In the first nine months after the act took effect, the FTC received
more than a thousand complaints against credit reporting agencies,
40. Id. at 5.
41. Indeed credit bureaus have been accused of using a "shotgun" approach to re-
cording judgments; that is, entering a judgment on all records bearing the same name
as the defendant's, or a similar name, without determining which individual actually
was involved. 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 4, at 963.
42. One investigator stated that it is common practice to state, for example, that
an individual is suspected of poor driving habits on the basis of a motor vehicle report
which reflects three or four accidents in two or three years, but which does not indicate
disposition, fault, or even whether the individual was charged. 1974 Proxmire Hearings,
supra note 19, at 20.
43. 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 4, at 983.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1681. The strongest provisions of the act (1) require users to
notify consumers of the name and address of the consumer reporting agency whenever
adverse action is taken on the basis of a report, § 1681m(a); (2) give the con-
sumer a right to be fully informed of the nature and substance of all information on
him, § 1681g; and (3) require reinvestigation and verification by the agency of all dis-
puted information, § 1681i(a).
45. One investigator stated, "We were constantly informed at the weekly office
meetings that the company 'can live with it [FCRA] as Mr. Burge [president, Retail Credit
Company] helped to formulate the requirements of the act."' 1974 Proxmire Hearings,
supra note 19, at 7. He further testified, "At first there was quite a bit of change, and
I think it was a wait-and-see policy. I think they waited long enough and they saw
nobody was bothering them, so they went back to the old way." Id. at 29.
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most of which were prompted by a lack of disclosure. The act does
not entitle the consumer to inspect, to copy or to handle his file. In-
stead, he must rely on the agency's interviewer to disclose the sub-
stance of the report. An FTC investigation revealed that credit bu-
reaus frequently withhold information from the consumer concerning
his character, reputation or morals.46 Additionally, a number of com-
plaints accused credit reporting firms of hindering consumers' efforts
to obtain disclosure by putting off inquiries with excuses such as, "the
man who handles that sort of thing isn't here right now," 47 or by telling
consumers that disclosure is only available at certain offices, and that
they can obtain disclosure only if they appear in person.4s
Furthermore, a number of credit bureaus require consumers to fill
out lengthy identification forms before disclosing the contents of their
file. These forms often contain a clause which authorizes the credit
bureau to investigate the consumer and which authorizes any business
or organization to release full information and records about him to the
credit bureau. The forms sometimes require the consumer to waive
any right to sue the agency for libel, invasion of privacy or negligence
in reporting false information. Other consumers have reported that
they were charged fees as high as $25 to learn the contents of their
files.4 9 Complaints about charges for reinvestigations of disputed in-
formation were also made. The FTC alleges that one credit bureau
would reinvestigate disputed information only if the consumer paid a
fee of $10 per hour, with a fifteen hour minimum payable in advance.5
In addition, the FTC has received complaints regarding obsolete infor-
mation5' and impermissible uses. 2
46. 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 4, at 659 (statement of Lewis A. Engman,
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission). The FTC complaint alleges that Retail
Credit does not always disclose the nature and substance of all information in its files
to the consumer as required by the FCRA. FTC Complaint against Retail Credit Co.,
supra note 18, at 10.
47. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 6 (statement by Salvatore
Sangiorgi, assistant director of FTC's New York regional office).
48. FTC Complaint against Retail Credit Co., supra note 18, at 10.
49. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1971, at 12, col. 5.
50. Id. In its complaint against Retail Credit the FTC allegcs that in certain in-
stances Retail Credit fails to:
(1) reinvestigate;
(2) record the current status of such information and to promptly delete in-
formation which can no longer be verified;
(3) clearly and conspicuously disclose to the consumer his right to request
notification of a deletion or of the inclusion of a statement prepared by
the consumer;
(4) provide notification to recipients of previous reports when requested to do
so by consumers, as required by the act.
FTC Complaint against Retail Credit Co., supra note 18, at 11.
51. FTC alleges that Retail Credit reports the existence of obsolete adverse infor-
mation through the use of certain stock sentences ("In compliance with the Fair Credit
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D. Approaches to Curbing Abuses
The harm from investigative consumer reports is unlikely to be
corrected in the immediate future by any single solution. The progress
that has been made has been the result of increasing consumer aware-
ness that credit investigating agencies are gathering and profiting from
information on their private lives. 53  Although sometimes unsuccess-
ful,54 the aggregate of consumer pressure has been felt. In 1974 Re-
Reporting Act no additional information can be reported from this former employer cov-
ering employment experience prior to seven years ago") Id. at 9, and by furnishing pho-
tocopies of motor vehicle reports reflecting masked out or obliterated driving violations
which antedate the report by seven years or more. Id.
52. FTC alleges that Retail Credit Co. provides a "Voluntary Follow-Up Service"
to its customers. This service consists of the submission of additional unsolicited ad-
verse information about consumers upon whom previous consumer reports have been
made. FTC complains that when such information is furnished, Retail has no reason
to believe it will be used in connection with a legitimate business transaction as required
by the FCRA. Id. at 8.
53. Some of the most effective work has been accomplished by private individuals.
David Weinberger of Miami, Florida, has been waging a crusade against Retail Credit
Company for sixteen years, ever since that company wrote "a very unfair" report on
him. See note 161, infra. He has testified at public hearings, drafted legislation and
given college lectures. His home has become a clearinghouse of materials on consumer
investigating agencies and privacy issues. He also played an important part in the pass-
age of the Dade County Ordinance. See note 273 infra. At age forty-six, Weinberger
completed law school to become a more effective advocate. Interview (telephone) with
David Weinberger, Nov. 12, 1974. See, e.g., Herman, Suing Retail Credit Co. is Career
and Pastime for David Weinberger, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
Paul Polin of Tulsa, Oklahoma has also built a reputation by battling Retail Credit
since an unfavorable report was written on him. Once, after Polin accompanied a man
to the Tulsa office of Retail Credit to find out why the man had been denied insurance,
the man received a call from the manager of the branch office who said, "If you stop
associating with Paul Polin, we'll make sure you have an A-1 report." 1973 Proxmire
Hearings, supra note 4, at 637 (testimony of John H. F. Shattuck, staff counsel, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union). Polin has also entered law school. Interview (telephone)
with Paul Polin, Nov. 23, 1974.
54. The credit reporting industry has actively opposed consumer measures. When
a tough credit reporting ordinance was being considered in Dade County, Florida, Retail
Credit was successful in persuading the originator of the bill that they could not live
with such restrictions. See, e.g., Lucoff and Gjebre, Cain bows to insurors, may drop
snooping ban, The Miami News, Aug. 28, 1974 at A-I, col. 1; Dauthat and Lucoff,
Credit firm threatens to leave Dade, The Miami News, Sept. 4, 1974, at 5A, col. 1.
When the ordinance was passed, Retail Credit filed suit against it less than two hours
after the vote. Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, Florida, Civ. No. 74-1104 (S.D. Fla.,
filed Sept. 3, 1974).
While a consumer credit bill was being considered in New Hampshire, Assembly-
man Tony Smith, who owns an insurance company and supported the bill, received
threatening calls and attempted bribes. Interview (telephone) with Tony Smith, Nov.
16, 1974.
A letter from Retail Credit addressed 'To Our Fellow Oklahomans" was used in
an attempt to defeat Oklahoma consumer reporting legislation. Letter from H.E. Dun-
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tail Credit reported that it was responding to about twenty-five con-
sumer suits a year.55 In 1975 the directors of Retail Credit decided
on a new name, Equifax, to replace the name they had so proudly
linked with "the whole industry" in 1968.56 In 1974 Retail Credit
voluntarily began allowing consumers to see their own files, 57 a meas-
ure they had strongly opposed in the past.58
Presently the abuses of investigative consumer reports are being at-
tacked from many different angles: newspapers are reporting the cases
of harm inflicted on individuals;5 9 legislative hearings are investigating
the credit reporting industry;60 and unprecedented numbers of bills
ham, District Sales Manager, '"o Our Fellow Oklahomans," March 1, 1972 on file with
David Weinberger, West Miami, Florida.
55. BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 16, 1974, at 106.
56. "We have retained the name Retail Credit Co. because it is somewhat of a
household word ... especially in the insurance industry where the term 'a retail credit
report' has become a generic term, synonymous with the activity of business reporting."
Hearings on Retail Credit Co. Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 (1968) (testi-
mony of W. Lee Burge, president, Retail Credit Co.) [hereinafter cited as Retail Credit
Hearings].
57. The New York Times, April 25, 1974, at 58, col. 2.
58. "So, as a matter of practical experience, either access to the file or giving the
person a copy of the file would create more problems. . . ." Retail Credit Hearings,
supra, note 56, at 16. See also Retail Credit Co. flyer, Hazards in Giving Subject a
Copy of Report, as cited in Foer, The Personal Information Market: An Examination
of the Scope and Impact of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 2 LoYoLX L. STuDENTS CoN-
SUMER J. 37, 62 n.122 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Foer].
59. E.g., Lewis, "Unmarried Woman Sues Insurer on Privacy Invasion," The
Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1974, § A, at 5, col. 5; Sesser, "Prying for Pay: How Credit
Bureaus Collect and Use Data on Millions of Persons," The Wall Street Journal, Feb.
5, 1968, at 1, col. 6; Auerbach, "Credit Probers: Consumer's Past Still Fair Game," Los
Angeles Times, Aug. 22, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
60. Thirteen congressional investigations were held between 1965 and 1971:
Year Committee Subject of Inquiry
1965 Senate, Judiciary Invasions of Privacy
1965 Senate, Judiciary Psychological Tests and
Constitutional Rights
1965 House, Government Invasions of Privacy
Operations
1966 House, Post Office Census Questions
& Civil Service
1966 House, Government Computers and the
Operations Invasion of Privacy
1967 Senate, Judiciary Computers and Privacy
1967 Senate, Judiciary Right of Privacy Act
of 1967
1967 House, Post Office Questions in the Census
& Civil Service




have been introduced into Congress and state legislatures 1
Additionally, a variety of judicial remedies is being considered
and applied to the injuries created by investigative consumer reports.
It has been suggested that credit reporting agencies should be held
liable for ordinary negligence in the preparation of consumer reportsA2
Alternatively, a "reasonable care" standard could be applied through
the law of product liability. Professor Alan Westin has suggested that
personal information be treated as a property right and thus protected
as a fundamental right under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.63  Advocates of this theory point to court treatment of
personal information in bank records as a property right of the deposi-
tor.64
Other approaches which are somewhat more limited could remedy
specific injuries. When inaccurate, irrelevant or misleading personal
information in an investigative consumer report results in higher in-
surance rates or denial of coverage, the consumer could look to state
1969 House, Post Office 1970 Census Legislation
& Civil Service
1969 Senate, Judiciary Privacy, The Census &
Federal Questionnaire
1971 House, Government Federal Personnel Records
Operations
1971 Senate, Judiciary Federal Data Banks, Com-
puters and Bill of Rights
In February, 1974, three congressional investigations were underway:
-The House Committee on Government Operations is conducting hearings
into the need for legislation governing Federal Personnel record keeping.
-The House Judiciary Committee is considering the Criminal Justice Informa-
tion Systems Act of 1974.
-The Senate Judiciary Committee is completing a survey of Federal data
banks which contain personal data about individuals. Press Release, Office of
White House Press Secretary Feb. 23, 1974, at 10.
61. In June, 1974, Congress had pending before it over 140 bills dealing with pri-
vacy issues. Remarks by Vice-President Gerald R. Ford, Georgia State Bar Association,
June 7, 1974. In the first six months of 1974, over sixty-five measures governing pri-
vacy had been introduced in state legislatures. Letter from Vice-President Ford to the
Judiciary Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Sen. Government Operations Comm.,
as cited in Statement of Philip W. Buchen, executive director, Domestic Council Com-
mittee on the Right of Privacy, June 19, 1974.
62. E.g., Note, Panacea or Placebo? Actions for Negligent Noncompliance Under
the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1070 (1974); Note, Con-
sumer Protection: Regulation and Liability of the Credit Reporting Industry, 47 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 1291 (1972); Retail Credit Co. v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 130 Ga.
App. 524, 203 S.E.2d 760 (1974) (action by insurance company against credit reporting
company based on alleged negligence, motion to compel discovery sustained).
63. See WEsTIN, supra note 5, at 324-25.
64. See, e.g., Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847, 849 (3d Cir. 1936); Brex v.
Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 390, 146 A. 34, 36 (Ch. 1929). See also Note, Credit Investi-
gations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEo. L.J. 509, 519-20
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Credit Investigations]. But see California Bankers Ass'n
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
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regulation of insurance companies. A measure against "unfair or de-
ceptive practices" or similar provision might provide a remedy. 5 Fed-
eral use of investigative consumer reports might be enjoined under the
Pinkerton Act of 1893, which provides that, "ain individual employed
by the Pinkerton Detective Agency, or similar organization, may not
be employed by the Government of the United States or the govern-
ment of the District of Columbia."00
H. Judicial Remedies
The traditional theories under which an action on credit reports
is brought are the tort theories of defamation and privacy. In 1965,
the Supreme Court recognized for the first time a constitutional basis
for the right of privacy.7 Although no court has yet decided whether
or not investigative consumer reports are an invasion of the constitu-
tional right of privacy, several cases are currently being litigated on this
issue.68
A. Defamation
Most of the cases involving consumer credit reports have been
libel suits. The requirements of a libel action, however, severely limit
the usefulness of this remedy for investigative consumer reports. The
allegedly defamatory statement must be false and must injure the repu-
tation of the plaintiff or diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or con-
fidence in which the plaintiff is held. 9 Credit reporting companies
can assert the defenses of qualified privilege, absolute privilege and
truth.70  The majority of American jurisdictions apply the qualified
privilege to consumer credit reports, recognizing them as a useful busi-
ness service for those who have a legitimate interest in obtaining the
information. 71  To defeat the qualified privilege, the consumer must
65. E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 790.06(a) (West 1972):
Whenever the commissioner shall have reason to believe that any person en-
gaged in the business of insurance is engaging in this State in any method of
competition or in any act or practice ... [that] is unfair or deceptive and
that a proceeding by him in respect thereto would be in the interest of the pub-
lic, [he may hold a hearing] for the purpose of determining whether the alleged
methods, acts or practices or any of them should be declared to be unfair or
deceptive within the meaning of this article.
66. Pinkerton Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3108 (1967).
67. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68. See, e.g., Thompson v. Aetna Cas. Co., Civ. No. 14,733 (D. Conn., filed Jan.
11, 1974); Cranz v. State Farm Ins. Co., Civ. No. 1858-73 (D.N.J., filed Jan. 4, 1974).
69. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 737-9 (4th Ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PaossER].
70. Id. at 776-801.
71. E.g., H.E. Crawford Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1957); Erber & Stickler v. R.G. Dun & Co., 12 F. 526 (C.C. E.D. Ark. 1882); Wetherby
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prove malice 72 or prove that information was released to the general
public or to persons who have no legitimate business interest in the
information.7 3
A constitutional privilege was recognized for the first time in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.74  The Court found that the First Amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of speech protects publication of informa-
tion about public officials. The constitutional privilege was extended
to protect publications of matters of public concern in Time, Inc. v.
Hill. Credit reporting agencies have asserted that a credit report is
constitutionally protected since its contents are a matter of general or
public concern. The Third, Fifth and Tenth Circuits, however, have
thoroughly refuted this assertion."
v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237, 201 A.2d 344 (1964); Shore v. Retailers Commercial
Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376 (1961); Barker v. Retail Credit Co., 8
Wis. 2d 664, 100 N.W.2d 391 (1960); Annot. 30 A.L.R.2d 776 (1953).
The English courts do not apply the qualified privilege. "It is only right that those
who engage in such a business, touching so closely very dangerous ground, should take
the consequences if they overstep the law." MacIntosh v. Dun [1908] 18 A.C. 390, 400
(P.C. 1908).
Two American jurisdictions have also refused to apply the qualified privilege to
credit reports. Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886); Pacific Packing Co. v.
Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 P. 1007 (1914).
In Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 32 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 985 (1974), the court cited two reasons for reaffirming the refusal to grant
a privilege. First, credit information is readily available in states where no conditional
privilege is recognized and the credit reporting industry is thriving there. Second, there
has been a shift in emphasis from the protection of the credit reporting agency to the
protection of the individual.
72. E.g., H.E. Crawford Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1957); Hooper-Holmes Bureau v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1947); Roemer v. Re-
tail Credit Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 368, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1970); 44 Cal. App. 3d 926,
119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1975).
73. Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, 194 F.2d 160 (D.D.C. 1952); Trussell
v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (Cir. Ct. Md. 1882); Pollasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N.W.
5 (1890); King v. Patterson, 49 NJ.L. 417, 9 A. 705 (Ct. Err. & App. 1887); Hales
v. Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, 114 Utah 186, 197 P.2d 910 (1948); Cook v.
Gust, 155 Wis. 594, 145 N.W. 225 (1914). See also Credit Investigations, supra, note
64.
74. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (newspaper advertisement on conduct of an Alabama po-
lice commissioner during racial disturbance held privileged).
75. 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (review of a play which was based on a fictionalized ac-
count of a family's ordeal as hostages of escaped convicts held privileged). See also
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
76. "[Matters of general and public interest do not include libelous and defama-
tory publications of such a commercial nature as credit reports." Hood v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1973); Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d
433 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971); Kansas Elec. Supply Co. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 449 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972).
See also Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1975).
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Truth is an absolute defense to an action for libel' 5 Because
many investigative reports cause great harm to the individual by re-
porting information which is true, but irrelevant to the purpose of the
report, the consumer injured by such a report must seek another legal
theory to obtain a remedy.
B. Tort of Invasion of Privacy
The origin of the tort of invasion of privacy is commonly traced
to an article by Warren and Brandeis in the Harvard Law Review of
1890.78 Warren and Brandeis were concerned with the invasion of
privacy by newspapers. r 9
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the
idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued
with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of
the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is
filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion
upon the domestic circle.80
Their concern also extended to other encroachments by the
"modern" society of 1890:
If we are correct in this conclusion [the existence of a right to pri-
vacy based on an inviolate personality], the existing law affords a
principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the in-
dividual from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the
photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for re-
cording or reproducing scenes or sounds.81
They rejected the defamation theory as a remedy for invasion of pri-
vacy because it dealt only with rights that are "in their nature material
rather than spiritual."8  Warren and Brandeis wanted to define a
larger concept which:
secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily,
to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be com-
municated to others. . . . The existence of this right does not
depend upon the particular method of expression adopted. 3
Early in the twentieth century the American courts began to
77. PROSSER, supra, note 69, at 797.
78. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) [here-
inafter cited as Warren and Brandeis].
79. Samuel Warren had become exceedingly annoyed over the journalistic ac-
counts of the personal details of his daughter's wedding. He turned to his friend and
former law partner, Louis D. Brandeis, who joined him in writing the article. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
80. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 78, at 196.
81. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 197.
83. Id. at 198-99.
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recognize a right of privacy,"4 and in 1939 this tort action was recog-
nized in the Restatement of Torts. 8 Presently, the right of privacy
is acknowledged by the courts in the overwhelming majority of states
and by statute in other states.86
Defenses to this tort action fall into two categories-consent and
privilege. The privilege defenses are identical to those in defamation
discussed above. Consent is a complete defense. It can be express
or implied, but if consent is a matter of contract, it is normally irrevo-
cable.87  Because of the notice requirement of the FCRA, credit agen-
cies can claim that applicants have consented to the investigation. 88
In 1960 Dean Prosser, leading American authority in the field of
torts, distinguished four tort actions for invasion of privacy.89 The first
of these, "intrusion," applies most directly to the abuses perpetrated
by investigative consumer reports. The concept of "intrusion" has ex-
panded from physical intrusions9" to nonphysical invasions such as
wiretapping, 91 microphones,92 peering through windows,93 persistent
and unwanted telephone calls94 and unauthorized prying into plain-
tiff's bank account.9 5 In Pearson v. Dodd,9 6 the District of Columbia
Circuit approved the extension of the intrusion tort to "instances of in-
84. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
85. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
86. N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§
839-40 (1958); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-8 and 76-4-9 (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 8-650
(1957).
87. E.g., Lillie v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 139 Cal. App. 724, 34 P.2d 835 (1934);
Long v. Decca Records, 76 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
88. Notice required under ECRA: "In compliance with The Fair Credit Reporting
Act we are informing you that as part of our routine procedures an investigative con-
sumer report may be prepared whereby information is obtained through personal inter-
views with your neighbors, friends and others with whom you are acquainted. The in-
quiry includes information as to your character, general characteristics and mode of liv
ing." 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 4, at 289.
89. 1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude or into his private af-
fairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. RaV. 383, 389 (1960).
90. Cf. DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881) (intruding at child-
birth); Young v. Western & A. R. Co., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929) (search
without warrant); Welsh v. Koehm, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (landlord
moving in on tenant).
91. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931).
92. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810
(1939).
93. Moore v. New York Elevated R. Co., 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892).
94. Carey v. Statewide Finance Co., 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 716, 223 A.2d 405 (1966).
95. Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929).
96. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969) (newspa-
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trusion . . . into spheres from which an ordinary man in a plaintiff's
position could reasonably expect that the particular defendant should be
excluded." 7 Objectionable snooping techniques used by consumer re-
porting companies such as the "welcome wagon," asking leading ques-
tions of neighbors and gaining entrance to the subject's home by mis-
representation, could be considered such an intrusion.
Prosser's second category, "public disclosure," also applies to in-
vestigative consumer reports, but in more limited circumstances. As
defined in the leading case of Melvin v. Reid98 there must be a public
disclosure of private facts which is offensive and objectionable to the
reasonable person. The requirement of public disclosure is seldom
found in investigative consumer reports which are confidential by na-
ture, unless the consumer can show breach of contract, trust or confi-
dential relation.99
The categorization of the privacy tort into four groups has been
influential in the development of the law of privacy, but Prosser's anal-
ysis has not been universally accepted. Professor Edward Bloustein
strongly disputed Prosser's conclusions, arguing that "the tort cases in-
volving privacy are of one piece and involve a single tort."'100 The con-
sideration behind that tort is the preservation of individual dignity. 01
Bloustein traced the "human dignity" concept of privacy to the article
by Warren and Brandeis. Through this analysis Bloustein provides a
conceptual link between the privacy tort and the Fourth Amendment




The Supreme Court declared the right of privacy to be constitu-
tionally protected in Griswold v. Connecticut.0 3  Although there ap-
per columnists who received copies of documents which were removed by others from
office of a senator and which were photocopied at night and returned to files were not
liable for conversion of physical documents).
97. Id. at 704. See also Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 NE.
2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970) (unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdropping by
mechanical and electrical means stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy); MIL-
LER, supra note 5, at 190-92.
98. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
99. E.g., Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va.
1968); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Berry
v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958); cf. Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb.
224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
100. Bloustein, supra note 5, at 1000.
101. Id. at 995.




peared to be little agreement among the seven concurring judges on
the theory, 10 4 it is clear that privacy was recognized as a fundamental
right which is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, found the right of privacy
among the penumbras of the Bill of Rights "formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."'1 5 He
cited Boyd v. United States,10 wherein the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments were described as protection against all governmental invasions
"of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' 07  Douglas
also referred to Mapp v. Ohio"' in which the Court spoke of the
Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important
than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the peo-
ple."' 0 9 Furthermore, Justice Douglas found that zones of privacy are
protected by the First, Third and Ninth Amendments.
Justice Goldberg, who was joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan, found the right of privacy to be one of the additional
fundamental rights protected by the Ninth Amendment. 10 Justice
Harlan based his concurring opinion"' on the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice White also relied on the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, citing from Prince v.
Massachusetts that there is a "realm of family life which the state can-
not enter.""12
2. Subsequent Decisions on Privacy and Principles Derived from Them
Analysis of the subsequent cases on privacy suggests that four
basic factors are considered by the courts in determining whether or
not there has been an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. These con-
siderations are: a) invasion of personal privacy or privacy of the home;
b) actual harm; c) balancing of other interests, and d) existence of
less restrictive alternatives.
104. See Emerson, Nine lustices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MicH. L. REv. 219
(1965).
105. 381 U.S. at484.
106. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
107. Id. at 630, cited in 381 U.S. at 484.
108. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
109. Id. at 656, cited in 381 U.S. at 485.
110. 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 'The enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
111. 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
112. Prince v. Massaehusetts 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), cited in 381 U.S. at 502.
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a. Invasion of Personal Privacy and Privacy of the Home
The thrust of the Griswold decision was a strong belief that the
home is a sacrosanct area which the state cannot enter. In criminal
actions, the home has long been protected from unreasonable search and
seizure by the Fourth Amendment. 113 With Griswold, the Court in-
voked a similar protection for noncriminal proceedings. Similarly, the
Court protected the sanctity of the home in Stanley v. Georgia14 where
the Court found that a state law prohibiting the possession of obscene
material in one's own home was an invasion of privacy.
Later cases indicate that the Court has broadened the interpreta-
tion of privacy to a more general personal privacy. In Eisenstadt v.
Baird"' a state ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried per-
sons was found to invade the privacy of the individual. In Roe v. Wade
the Court concluded that "the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision. .... 116
In a limited number of cases, the Court has refused to find an
invasion of the fundamental right of privacy. The Court held in Wyman
v. James1 7 that the home visits required for welfare were not an un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy.118 The majority opinion, how-
ever, was careful to insure the "propriety" of the home visit. The
Court seemed to be saying that the purpose of the home visit was
simply to verify actual residence and the physical presence of the chil-
dren in the home and that further investigation should be limited:
Outside informational sources, other than public records, are to be
consulted only with the beneficiary's consent. Forcible entry or
entry under false pretenses or visitation outside workdng hours or
snooping in the home are forbidden."19
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas'20 the Court found that a zon-
ing ordinance which limited the number of unrelated persons living in
a single household was not an invasion of privacy.' 2 ' Justice Marshall
113. E.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
114. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
115. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
116. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
117. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
118. But see Douglas dissent, questioning "whether the government by force of its
largesse has the power to 'buy up' rights guaranteed by the Constitution." Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 328 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 321.
120. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
121. But cf. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
The Court held that a provision of the Food Stamp Act limiting participation to house-
holds of related people, thereby denying participation to nonrelated households, violated
the due process clause.
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dissented, basing his disagreement on the First Amendment freedom
of association and the constitutional right of privacy.
While the Supreme Court decisions on the constitutional right of
privacy have involved a limited number of subject areas, the lower
courts have faced a wider range of issues. It appears that the decisions
of Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe are being extended to protect all as-
pects of personal privacy, especially in sexual relations, 2 ' unless the
privacy has been violated by the subjects themselves or is outweighed
by a state interest. The courts also seem to be in agreement that one's
private sexual relationships or practices cannot be the basis for dis-
missal from employment'23 unless they would interfere with the per-
formance of duties.2 4
The courts have protected the privacy of the home and family re-
lationships against invasion by the overzealous gathering of informa-
tion. In Merriken v. Cressman12 5 the court balanced the right of pri-
vacy against the need for a drug abuse program in the public schools
and found that the balance struck in favor of individual privacy. The
program was to be initiated through a questionnaire which asked highly
personal questions. 126
122. "Mhe apparent trend of recent decisions would indicate that such a right [to
engage in deviant sexual conduct] among or between consenting adults does exist."
United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606, 607 (M.D. Pa. 1973). "In short, private
conduct which is not harmful to others, even though it may violate the personal moral
code of most of us, does not violate public morality. . . . To hold otherwise would be
to encourage governmental inquisition into an applicant's purely personal private temper-
ament and habits. . . even though such attitudes or conduct would not harm others."
In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 927-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Personal privacy is not protected, however, when it is violated by plaintiff. Lovisi
v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973) (subjects photographed their sexual acts
and allowed the pictures to fall into their children's hands).
123. E.g., Drake v. Covington County Board of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (unmarried teacher improperly dismissed for becoming pregnant where only evi-
dence of pregnancy was solicited from her own physician); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F.
Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972) (teacher's contract wrongly terminated when basis of termi-
nation was inferences of "improper" conduct in her associations in her own home); Min-
del v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (post
office clerk wrongly terminated when investigation disclosed he was living with a young
lady without the benefit of marriage).
124. E.g., Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (homosexual activi-
ties can be inquired into for security clearance); Acanfora v. Board of Educ. of Mont-
gomery County, 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973) (dismissal of homosexual upheld when
he made his own case a matter of public controversy); Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F.
Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972) (reasonable inquiry valid to determine whether homosexual
conduct will affect suitability for federal civil service where there was evidence of a sex-
ual advance on a minor in the building where employed).
125. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
126. The student was asked whether his family is "very close, somewhat close, not
too close, or not close at all"; whether his parents "hugged and kissed him good-night
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In Galella v. Onassis'2 7 the district court held that the actions of
a self-styled "investigative reporter" violated Jacqueline Onassis' right
to privacy:
The rationale [of the right of privacy] extends to protect against
usreasonably intrusive behavior which attempts or succeeds in
gathering information. . and includes, but is not limited to, such
disparate abuses of privacy as the unreasonable seeking, gathering,
storing, sharing and disseminating of information by humans and
machines.128
Other decisions have indicated the willingness of the courts to protect
personal privacy.129
The issue of whether the privacy doctrine would protect substan-
tive personal information which has been recorded and filed has not
yet been decided. Two cases have presented the question of protect-
ing medical information from required disclosure to state officers. The
United States District Court of Connecticut found that a statute com-
pelling psychiatrists to report names and other information about drug-
dependent persons to the Commissioner of Health did not violate the
right to privacy.'3 0 In a similar case, however, the Second Circuit re-
versed an order of dismissal and left open the possibility of protecting
medical records:
If there is anything "obvious" about the constitutional right to pri-
vacy at the present time, it is that its limits remain to be worked out
in future cases. Should the constitutionally protected zone of pri-
vacy be extended beyond the area already recognized, the individ-
ual's interest in keeping to himself the existence of his physical ail-
ments and his doctor's prescriptions for them would lie rather close
in [sic] the continuum.' 81
On remand, the three-judge district court denied the motion for pre-
liminary injunction, but held that the plaintiff should be given the op-
portunity to explore the "outer reaches" of the right to privacy and to
submit detailed analysis of the competing interests involved. The court
outlined a three-part test which plaintiffs must meet:
Specifically, the plaintiffs must be afforded the opportunity to
demonstrate that the computerization of names is not necessary for
when he was small"; whether they told him how "much they loved him or her"; whether
the parents "seemed to know what the student's needs or wants are"; and whether the
student "feels that he is loved by his parents." Id. at 918.
127. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), reh. denied, 487 F.2d 986 (1973).
128. Id. at 232. On appeal, the decision was upheld, but on more narrow grounds.
129. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974) (protection against in-
voluntary sterilization by the United States Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare);
Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (operation of nudist colonies
and persons engaged in nudist practices protected).
130. Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970).
131. Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 1973) (statute requiring patient's
name and prescription for certain drugs).
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the accomplishment of the state's goals, that the controls developed
by the state are inadequate to protect against unauthorized dis-
closure of the computerized information and that the injury to the
plaintiffs resulting from the implementation of this system of cen-
tralized filing is sufficiently serious to overcome any competing
state interest.'32
In other cases where substantive personal informationi was di-
vulged, courts have found extraneous reasons for not protecting the in-
formation with the privacy doctrine. Records of a dentist were not pro-
tected, since they would reveal nothing that would not be divulged by
looking into the person's mouth.133  Official immunity was found to
protect members of Congress, their staff and school system employees
from suit regarding a report which included names, absentee records,
test papers and disciplinary records of certain students in the District
of Columbia.114
b. Actual Harm
In cases where a violation of privacy has been found, plaintiffs
have shown actual harm. The harm has been either a denial of per-
sonal freedoms, or denial of a benefit such as employment or citizen-
ship. In Roe v. Ingraham, the Court suggested that the injury must
be sufficiently serious to overcome any competing state interest.135
c. Balancing Other Interests
When an invasion of privacy is found on the facts of the case, it
will be balanced against the opposing interests to determine which, in
the given instance, must be accorded the greater value. The courts
use different standards of review depending on the type of interest in-
volved. Justice Stone first alluded to these differences in his opinion
for the Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 36 where a
presumption of constitutionality was applied to state regulation of eco-
nomic rights.13 7  In an oft-quoted footnote to that case, Justice Stone
132. Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 546-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
133. In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
134. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). The appellate court had denied in-
junctive relief, but an agreement was made whereby the school district suspended further
publication or distribution of the report and instituted new policies regarding the release
of confidential information.
135. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
136. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
137. See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), ("[IThe guaranty of due
process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial re-
lation to the object sought to be attained." Id. at 525); and West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) ("Liberty [freedom to contract] under the Constitution
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suggested that a stricter standard of review would be appropriate where
fundamental rights are involved:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth. 3 8
Later cases have further established the preferred status accorded fun-
damental rights.139 The right of privacy was included among the fun-
damental rights by a majority of the Court in Griswold, and thus was
afforded the higher standard review.
Individual privacy has not been protected by the courts when it
was found to be outweighed by the public interest. 40  Two courts have
stated that the right of privacy does not protect the social security num-
ber when used as a means of identification.' 4 ' Similarly, courts have
upheld mandatory fingerprinting of employees of stock exchange
firms,"'42 and of mental patients. 43
While these decisions are disturbing in the inability of the courts
to foresee the potential abuses inherent in universal identifying factors,
it is significant that the information required (social security numbers
and fingerprints) is not in itself "private" in the same sense as is infor-
mation on a person's sexual habits.
is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is rea-
sonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is
due process." Id. at 391).
138. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937).
139. Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Jones
v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
140. Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
981 (1966) (privacy in public restroom not protected when used for homosexual activi-
ties); Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973) (legal enforcement of familial
monetary obligation outweighs individual privacy invaded by requiring disclosure of
father's name); United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743 (D. Conn. 1973) (right to
use marijuana in the home not protected); Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute,
316 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1970) (state requirement that students live in a dormitory
does not violate right to privacy).
141. Cantor v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 353 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(upheld requirement that each lawyer submit his or her social security number to the
state supreme court). Unreported decision discussed in Conant v. Hill, 326 F. Supp.
25, 26 (E.D. Va. 1971) (upheld state statute requiring submission of social security
number to receive a driver's license).
142. Thom v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd
sub nom. Miller v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 425 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970).
143. Winters v. Miller, 446 'F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
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d. Less Restrictive Alternatives
It is well-established that courts will apply the principle of less
restrictive alternatives to fundamental freedoms. Justice Douglas re-
lied on this principle in his opinion for the Court in Griswold:
[A] governmental purpose to control or prevent activities consti-
tutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. 144
Justice White also spoke to this point in his concurring opinion. Citing
from Shelton v. Tucker, he stated that statutes regulating sensitive areas
of liberty "must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achiev-
ing the same basic purpose."'145 In Roe v. Ingraham, the court ex-
pressed the desirability of a showing by plaintiffs that a less restrictive
alternative was available.' 46
3. Application of Principles to Investigative Credit Reports
Investigative consumer reports are an invasion of the constitu-
tionally protected right of privacy in the following ways. First, investi-
gative credit reports invade personal privacy and privacy of the home.
Second, they cause actual harm. Third, the right of privacy outweighs
the economic rights it must be balanced against. Finally, there are less
restrictive means of accomplishing the same ends which do not cause
such grave invasions of a constitutionally protected right.
a. Invasion of Personal Privacy and Privacy of the Home
Investigative credit reports violate personal privacy in that they
contain irrelevant and opinionated information from third persons.
They violate privacy of the home by reporting information gathered
from the consumer's home under false pretenses.
As stated earlier, investigators seek out "opinion" and "hearsay"
information concerning the applicant. Questions and instructions
on standard report forms invite various invasions of privacy. A report
form for Q'Hanlon on automobile insurance asks:
Do the Following Apply to Any Driver?
18. Common law marriage (initiated past 5 years)?
19. Moral reputation not good?
21. Undesirableassociates?
24. Antagonistic-antisocial-uncooperative? (Insured or family
members refuses to cooperate, antagonistic to neighbors,
etc.)1 47
144. 381 U.S. at 485, quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
145. 381 U.S. at 504, quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
146. Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
147. 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra, note 4, at'856.
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An Automobile Insurance Report form for Retail Credit asks if
home conditions are questionable. This form also provides a chart for
the investigator to complete on applicant's drinking habits. After
checking either "Drinks to Intoxication," "Drinks to Boisterousness,"
or "Drinks to Mild Excess" the investigator is to answer the following:
"How often? Where? Last occasion? Drive after drinking? Length
of excesses?"'148
A form entitled "Life Report" of Retail Credit asks:
15. Anything adverse about living conditions or neighborhood?
16. Do any of the following apply to this applicant: Heavy debts?
Domestic trouble? Drug habit? Connection with illegal
liquor?
17. Is there any criticism of character, morals, or general reputa-
tion?149
Company policies encourage offensive means of gathering informa-
tion. The president of Hooper-Holmes described the procedure of an
inspector who is suspicious of an extra marital affair:
You go to a neighbor and establish rapport. Then you ask,
"What's your opinion of X's home life; how do you think of him as
a family man?" This will usually elicit some hint-through the ex-
pression on their faces or the way they answer. Then you start
digging. You press them as far as they go, and if they become re-
calcitrant, you go somewhere else."' 50
And on homosexuality, he added:
Homosexuality is one of the most difficult things to determine. If
you have that sixth sense that something is wrong, you dig. The
tip-off is their mode of living, their circle of friends and the or-
ganizations they belong to.' 51
An interoffice memorandum of Retail Credit encourages investigators
to "dig" far into the intimacies of an applicant's sexual life. The
memorandum declares:
It Makes the Difference
This Doesn't Tell the Story-
"Lives common law."
"Lives with Mr. - (different name) but sources do not know
the relationship."
"Subject living with woman without benefit of marriage."
"He is divorced because of his association with other women."
"He lives with another man and sources suspect them of living in
an immoral relationship."
We Haven't Done the Job Unless We've Found Out and Reported-
Current marital status-
148. Id. at 852-53.
149. Id. at 850.
150. TH NEW REPUBLIC, April 27, 1968, at 11.
151. Id.
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If divorced-when, why, whose fault?
If separated-how long, cause, divorce planned.?
Past and present moral reputation-
If promiscuous-extent, class of partners?
If particular affinity-how long, criticized, partner benefi-
ciary?
If living with partner-how long, children, stable home,
criticized, is there living undivorced spouse?
If illegitimate child-how old, circumstances, favorable repu-
tation regained, living and working conditions?
Possible homosexuality-
How determined-living together, demonstrates affection for
partner in public, dress and/or manner, criticized, associates
with opposite sex?152
Credit investigating companies also have a policy of "pumping"
doctors for personal information about their patients. A Retail Credit
interoffice report entitled "Physician Source File Study" offered these
"successful approaches" when physicians refuse to give investigators an
interview:
DOCTOR STATES TOO BUSY
Obtain as much information as possible from nurse or secretary
and contact doctor only briefly for clarification and/or signature.
Explain to doctor that in the long run you will save him time. By
granting you an interview, he cuts back on clerical and secretarial
time required to reply to correspondence.
DOCTOR STATES HE LETS NURSE OR
SECRETARY HANDLE PAPER WORK
Agree to obtain information from nurse or secretary and then see
doctor only briefly for clarification and/or signature.
DOCTOR STATES HE DISLIKES INSURANCE COMPANIES
Use the "this will help the patient" approach.
DOCTOR STATES HE ALREADY HAS SENT
INFORMATION TO INSURANCE COMPANY
Explain that you are only interested in clarifying several important
points .... 153
Physician interviews can result in the recording of highly personal in-
formation which is irrelevant to any legitimate business purpose. One
underwriting medical history report noted "4-6-72 Husband & Wife
discussion concerning sexual matters. 1 4
Much information is gathered from the consumer under false pre-
152. 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 4, at 845.
153. Retail Credit Company, "Physician Source File Study (Summary)," Jan. 3,
1968 (unpublished study on file with Warren Leech, Santa Cruz, California).
154. Retail Credit Company Underwriting Medical History Report, Form B 11113,
Jan., 1972 (name and policy number confidential) (on file with Warren Leech,
Santa Cruz, California).
Summer 19751 ITITLE BROTHER
HASTINGS CONSITrUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tenses. Retail Credit's 1964 Inspector's Manual' 55 tells how a person's
eligibility for auto insurance can be reviewed after an auto accident by
going to the person's house under the pretense of inspecting the dam-
aged auto:
If the insured offers to show you the car, always accept, since this
further fixes his idea of a physical inspection.. . in the insured's
mind.
Whether you give out the name of our company depends upon the
caliber of person to whom you are talking. . . . If a low-grade
or ignorant person, this may not be desirable. With foreign and in-
dustrial types, few preliminaries are required1 56
A typical report on current assets and income stated the following:
"We interviewed the subject's father under pretext. .... I"
In its complaint against Retail Credit, 158 the FTC charged, inter
alia, that agents misrepresent themselves as agents of the company to
which the consumer applied for a benefit and that the information fur-
nished by the consumer would be used exclusively by that company.
This practice, the complaint continues, leads consumers to divulge
more information than they would otherwise elect to provide had they
known the true identity of the agent.
The above practices by credit reporting agencies certainly go far
beyond the allowable means outlined for welfare home visits in Wyman
v. James, where the Supreme Court enumerated certain prohibited
practices, including "entry under false pretenses" and "snooping in the
home." Additionally, the Court specified that "[o]utside informa-
tional sources, other than public records, are to be consulted only with
the beneficiary's consent."159
b. Actual Harm
In many cases the harm resulting from investigative consumer re-
ports has been direct and substantial. First of all, the applicant is
denied the benefit applied for. Denial or cancellation of auto insur-
ance is not an uncommon result of investigative reports containing
highly personal and irrelevant information. 160 In other cases investiga-
155. This manual was released as a result of a lawsuit.
156. Douthat, Gossip, hearsay, second-hand facts used in credit reports, The Miami
News, May 3, 1973, at IA, col. 1.
157. Retail Credit Company Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., Current Assets and
Income Report, Form 4570, September, 1970 (name and claim number confidential)
(on file with Warren Leech, Santa Cruz, California).
158. See note 18 supra.
159. 400 U.S. 309, 321 (1971).
160. Galen L. Cranz, Princeton University faculty member was denied auto insur-
ance on the basis of a credit report that mentioned she was living with a man to whom
she was not married. ACLU Foundation, The Privacy Report, No. 6, Ian. 1974, at 6.
She has filed suit, Cranz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 1858-73 (D.N.J.,
filed Jan. 4, 1974).
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five credit reports have resulted in denial of employment opportunities,
promotions" 1 and business licenses."0 2
Second, since the adverse personal information remains in the
credit company's files, the same benefit is denied by other companies
to whom the person applies. Insurance companies automatically view
with suspicion anyone who has been turned down or cancelled by an-
other insurance company.163  The result of an adverse report can,
therefore, either leave the consumer without employment, insurance or
credit, or force the consumer to accept a lower-paying job or less satis-
factory insurance at a higher cost.
Beverly Thompson, 43, was denied renewal of her auto insurance policy on the ba-
sis of an investigative report that stated her boyfriend "was practically living" with her.
Subsequently, she was refused insurance at normal rates by nine other companies. Even-
tually she settled for an assigned-risk policy with less coverage and higher premiums.
The Angry Consumer, MONEY, Oct., 1974, at 26. Ms. Thompson is suing Retail Credit
Company and ten insurance companies. Thompson v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., Civ.
No. 14,733 (D. Conn., filed Jan. 11, 1974).
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company cancelled the policy on one car belonging
to Robert Meisner, whose credit report had grossly understated his and his wife's salaries
and had labeled his son a "hippie-type youth" active in antiestablishment concerns. In
reality, his son was a model student, letter athlete and had recently campaigned for a
Republican candidate. Shaffer, Consumers Gripe That Credit Reporting Law Doesn't
Always Work, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
At age 57, a doctor (also retired colonel, United States Air Force Reserve) was
refused auto insurance for the first time in his life. His investigative report stated he
was sloppy and slovenly. He was interviewed on the day he was released from the hos-
pital, wearing a bathrobe and surrounded by papers and correspondence. Letter from
[confidential] to David Weinberger, West Miami, Florida.
James C. Millstone, an editor of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, was turned down for
auto insurance because a report stated he had "lack of judgment," "undisciplined kids," a
prior history of evictions, and a "bad attitude." The report proved to contain inaccurate
allegations from a disgruntled neighbor. Millstone has filed a $100,000 punitive damage
suit. Millstone v. National Inspection Bureau (O'Hanlon Reports), Civil No. 72-C224-4
(E.D. Mo. filed April 11, 1972).
161. David Weinberger was denied employment at IBM on the basis of a pre-
employment character check. The report stated he had been a business partner with
a man who was facing charges for illegal use of the mails, when in fact he had merely
purchased supplies from the alleged lawbreaker. Interview (telephone) with David
Weinberger, Nov. 12, 1974; Herman, Suing Retail Credit Co. Is Career and Pastime for
David Weinberger, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 1974, at 1, col. 1. Numerous other
examples of denial of employment because of false information in credit reports have
been reported. E.g., 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 5; Haigley, Your credit
records may be wrong, The Miami News, Sept. 17, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
162. Paul Roemer was denied an insurance license on the basis of false and mali-
cious information in his investigative report. The information was given by an ex-busi-
ness associate whom Roemer was suing. Roemer has sued Retail Credit. The case has
been tried and appealed two times, resulting in jury award of $57,500 the first time and
$250,000 the second. Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal. Rptr.
82 (1975); Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 368, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1970).
163. See Cranz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 160.
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c. Balancing Other Interests
The invasion of privacy which results from investigative consumer
reports must be weighed against the legitimate business interests
served by the reports. On the one hand is the need of credit com-
panies, insurance companies and prospective employers to protect
themselves against unreasonable risks. In the credit industry alone
hundreds of millions of dollars rest upon decisions regarding the exten-
sion of credit to individuals. The decisionmakers must be informed
about a person's solvency and reliability. Automobile insurers need
to know a person's driving record and other pertinent facts before tak-
ing the risk of insuring that person. Life insurance companies should
know the medical history and the physical condition of the applicant,
as well as the hobbies and interests of the applicant if they involve spe-
cial dangers such as skydiving or mountain-climbing. An employer
should know the experience and abilities of a prospective employee
and the educational background of the applicant and his characteristics
which might determine suitability for a particular assignment. The fil-
ing of such information holds certain cost-saving efficiencies which are
helpful in the business world. The information thus gathered allows
for "statistical stereotyping" as a means of making a large number of
decisions in the shortest amount of time.
On the other hand, however, is the individual applicant's funda-
mental right of privacy. The underlying approach to investigative con-
sumer reports indicates a direct contradiction of the constitutional right
of privacy. In a programmed learning course for investigators, this
philosophy is clear:
[W]ould you say that this information touches upon many highly
personal aspects of the insured person's life? . . . We feel that it
does. That is the nature of insurance.164
The bias of the reporting industry appears again in a summary of
the lesson:
4. Information, to be reliable, must be obtained from, or verified
through, unbiased sources.
5. The best sources of information concerning general aspects of
an insurance applicant's personal life are usually neighbors, though
other types of sources are often necessary for specialized informa-
tion.'65
The practice of gathering irrelevant information is fostered by the
reporting industry:
The amount of protective information is an indicator of the quality
of the report, overall.
164. Retail Credit Company, "This Business of Ours," Programmed Learning
Course 2, at 12.
165. Id. at 23.
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We get it drummed into [our] heads that we must protect our
customer-to protect him from the deadbeats.'16
The result is the collection of an inordinate amount of information
which is irrelevant to any legitimate business purpose.'1 7  Actual cases
in the files of Retail Credit display these irrelevancies. 68
False information also gets into the files. In some cases false in-
formation is included by mistake, but in other cases it is intentionally
recorded. The intent can spring from a source who does not like the
166. Douthat, Credit bureaus pry into millions of lives, The Miami News, May 2,
1973, at 4A, col. 1.
167. See note 160, supra. In the cases of Beverly Thompson and Gail Cranz, the
denial of auto insurance was based on their private lives rather than their driving rec-
ords. The Thompson investigative report contained no criticisms on driving habits,
drinking habits or personal habits. After the comment that Ms. Thompson "was practi-
cally living with her boyfriend," the report itself emphasized the irrelevancy of this in-
formation:
AGAIN, IT MUST BE REPEATED THAT IN SPITE OF A BELIEF THAT
THEY WERE LIVING TOGETHER, THE SUBJECT AND HER FRIEND
ENJOYED GOOD PERSONAL REPUTATIONS. Exhibit A, Thompson v.
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., Civ. No. 14,733 (D. Conn., filed Jan. 11, 1974).
Health insurance companies justify the prurient interest in a person's sexual life by
making it a risk factor. In a table of "debit" and "credit" factors for life insurance,
"[slexing too much" is listed as a debit. H. DINGMAN, INSURAILrrIY, PROGNOSIS, AND
SELECTION 180, as cited in E. FAULKNER, HEATH INSURANCE 334 (1960).
Sen. Proxmire questioned Lee Burge, President of Retail Credit, on the relevancy
of extraneous factors. Regarding a question on "type of associates," the senator asked:
Sen. Proxmire: Now what does all of this have to do with life insurance?
Mr. Burge: Well, in the first place, a man who might have underworld connec-
tions or poor associates, or exposures-
Sen. Proxmire: What are poor associates?
Mr. Burge: Poor associates-people who have a high incidence of crime.
Sen. Proxmire: Who can determine that in a 20 or 30 minute investigation?
Hearings on S.823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Sen. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 206 (1969).
168. The file of an attorney applying for life insurance reported that "ex-wife was
suspected of infidelity." No source was cited. Id.
Several investigative reports were released by Retail Credit Co. in connection with
litigation. Miami News v. City of Miami, No. 74-12503 (11th Jud. Cir., Dade County,
Fla., filed May 3, 1974). One report stated, 'This source stated that she was the maid
at the MY residence. She stated that she knew who [Mr. X] was, but did not know
anything about him. She said that he was president of some big business."
It continued, "We were unable to interview your claimant. We made an attempt
on 8-28-73 at 12:30 p.m. and found two cars parked in the driveway of his house, one
1973 Cadillac, 1973 Ford. This is a very large, very expensive home that would prob-
ably sell at today's market prices for $150-175M. There appeared to be some people
in the house but no one answered the door."
Another report stated, "This source told us that Mr. [X is no longer living at the
address in question and that the person living there now is Mr. Y] who is married to
Mr. X's] former wife."
After listing three more unsuccessful attempts to establish an address, the investi-
gator wrote, "We are closing this report as we have used all authorized time."
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applicant or who is otherwise unreliable, 169 or from an investigator who
is trying to save time by "zinging" cases.
The amount of false information in consumer reports is substan-
tial. Recently, TRW, a credit investigation company which deals only
with hard data, reported that "only" one-third of the inquiries from con-
sumers resulted in correction of error. 7 0
Thus, the court must "balance" business' need for information
against the injury caused by the use of highly personal information
which is often false or irrelevant. In some cases the right of privacy
clearly outweighs the other side. One such case involved a Senate aide
who had helped draft legislation which was opposed by the prescription
drug industry. Using the pretext of a preemployment investigation,
a large drug company retained Retail Credit to make an investigative
consumer report on him."" A similar case involved a lobbyist in Min-
nesota who had opposed the interests of Burlington-Northern Railroad.
Counsel for Burlington ordered a "character report" on her from Retail
Credit.'7 2
Even where there is a legitimate business need for an investigative
consumer report, the potential for harm outweighs the need for infor-
mation. The claim that insurance companies require such information is
unsubstantiated. No actuarial tables exist as to the additional risks in
insuring homosexuals or unmarried couples living together.'7 3  No
need has been documented for such personal information which these
reports seem to thrive on. The "Gestalt theory" upon which the in-
169. A former Retail Credit Co. investigator testified as to a report which caused
an applicant's auto insurance to be denied: "The report stated, without qualification, that
the subject's neighbors knew her to be a 'lady of the evening,' that Nhe had visitors come
and go very late at night, that she drove fast, and that she was a heavy drinker...
When I went to the subject's neighborhood, I talked to no less than 10 persons, all of
whom held the subject in high respect. All of them also told me that the neighborhood
'nut' lived next to her." 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 11-12.
170. Bride, Definition of Privacy Needed Before Action Can Start, CoMTU'Tr-
woRLD May 15, 1974, at 6. It is probable that the soft data in investigative credit reports
would be even more susceptible to error.
171. 116 CONG. REc. 32,839 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Long). M. MINz & J.
CoHEN, AMERICA, INC. 323-24 (1974); Washington Post, July 21, 1969, at A5. See
also Nader v. General Motors Corp., supra note 97.
172. E.g., Minneapolis Tribune, Feb. 6, 1974, § B; St. Paul Pioneer Press, Feb. 7,
1974, at 17; St. Paul Dispatch, Feb. 7, 1974.
173. The insurance industry has been unable to furnish Senator Proxmire's Con-
sumer Credit subcommittee with any actuarial figures showing how a person's morals or
housekeeping habits affect his longevity. 1973 Proxmire Hearin's, supra note 4, at
283-86.
There are no statistics correlating risks and information on morals and character.
Interviews (telephone) with Mark Kaikee, chief, Rate Regulation Division, Cal. Dept.
of Insurance, Dec. 23, 1974, and William Empwistle, Life Underw citing Division, Occi-
dental Life Ins. Co., Dec. 23, 1974.
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vestigative reports are based appears to be an unnecessarily vague ap-
proach to getting information.
d. Less Restrictive Alternatives
As indicated above, the courts require that the least restrictive al-
ternative be used where fundamental freedoms are invaded. Thus, if
a less restrictive alternative is available, it must be used regardless of
the results of the balancing test.
In the case of investigative consumer reports, many less restrictive
alternatives are available. The first and most obvious way to establish
the necessary facts is by direct inquiry. The forms filled out by the
applicant should be relied on for certain information. Even though
some persons may give false information, it should not be assumed that
all information on application forms is unreliable.
Second, consumer reports can be used. These reports include the
same information as investigative consumer reports, except they are not
based on third person interviews. Thus the dangers of hearsay infor-
mation, opinion and malicious gossip are not present. To evaluate an
application for credit, the credit report should be sufficient. It contains
all relevant information on the applicant's financial standing and bill-
paying habits. 74
In the case of auto insurance, the applicant's driving record for
a limited number of years should be sufficient information to determine
the risks involved in insuring the particular applicant. Any additional
information regarding the applicant's character, habits and lifestyle is ir-
relevant if it is not reflected in his or her performance as a driver.
In the case of health insurance and life insurance, a complete
medical record is a sufficient basis for evaluating risk factors. Random
neighborhood interviews are certainly not a reliable means of establish-
ing additional information on a person's health.
In the case of an application for employment the relevant factors
are experience, ability to get along with co-workers and sometimes
education. These factors can be evaluated sufficiently by document-
ing the information given by the applicant. Relevant character traits
could be investigated through interviews with references and past em-
ployers.
D. Problem of Finding Governmental Action
The Bill of Rights protects individual freedoms against interfer-
174. Consumer reports are also subject to abuse and harm resulting from false in-
formation and outdated information. Since they do not incorporate information gath-
ITTLE BROTHERSummer 1975]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
ences by the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects fundamental personal rights from interference by state govern-
ments .175 Purely private conduct abridging fundamental liberties, how-
ever, remains beyond the scope of constitutional protection. 76 Thus,
the foregoing argument for holding that investigative credit reports are
an invasion of the constitutional right of privacy rests upon the assump-
tion that the requirements for governmental action are satisfied.
1. Principles of Governmental Action
In 1883 the Supreme Court decided the Civil Rights Cases,1
77
which established the principle that a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment occurred only when state legislation denied individual
rights to citizens, or when an action had been taken by a state official
if, and only if, that act could be imputed to the state.
Since that decision, the concept of state or governmental action
has been expanded considerably. The court now recognizes that
"[c]onduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined . . .
with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional
limitations placed upon state action.' 78  Government action has been
found in a variety of forms of government involvement, the limits of
which are difficult to define.
The most obvious category is formal action by government or its
agents, and includes state legislation and municipal ordinances, 79 the
activities of state officials operating "under color of law" though unau-
thorized by the state 80 and judicial enforcement of private agree-
ments.'18
A second line of cases identifies government action in the activi-
ties of a nominally private individual where the government directly or
indirectly exercises control. Under this reasoning, substantial govern-
ment financing may subject the organization to constitutional limita-
tions, at least where such financing is essential to the operation of the
ered from third person interviews, however, consumer reports are suggested as a prefer-
able alternative to investigative consumer reports.
175. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[no state] shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
176. The Court has reaffirmed this distinction on numerous occasions: Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
177. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
178. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
179. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
180. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346-48 (1880); Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1947); Cat-
lette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1943).
181. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
[Vol. 2
organization.182  Significant government regulation 8 3 may likewise be
sufficient for a finding of government action, although mere licensing
is not enough.:""
Government action may also be found where private parties carry
on a public function ordinarily performed by governmental agency.
Thus, company towns that maintain public thoroughfares, 5 shopping
plazas that replace municipal business districts, 86 nominally private
organizations operating formerly public parks,18 7 and party primaries
that are an integral part of the state's elective processes 8 are con-
sidered state instrumentalities.
The test for government action as devised in Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority looks to the sum of the various indicia of govern-
ment involvement. Recognizing the impossibility of formulating a pre-
cise test for determination of government responsibility, the Court
stated, "[ojnly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-
obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its
true significance."'18 9 The court added together all of the activities,
obligations and responsibilities of the parking authority; the mutual
benefits arising out of the lessor-lessee relationship; and the fact that
the restaurant was operating as an integral part of a public building.
It held that these facts, along with the inaction of the parking authority
in the face of discriminatory practices by its lessee, led to the conclusion
that the state had "so far insinuated itself into a position of interde-
pendence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant
in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered
to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment."' 90
182. E.g., Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965); Kerr
v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721
(1945).
183. Public Util. Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
184. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
185. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
186. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968). But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (denial of right
to distribute antiwar leaflets by privately owned shopping center held not to constitute
state action).
187. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
188. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
189. 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
190. Id. at 725. Since this note was written, the Supreme Court decided Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), in which it held that there was in-
sufficient state involvement in the operation of a private utility to support a finding of
state action. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist rejected the plaintiff's conten-
tion that the defendant utility company had violated the due process clause of the Four-
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2. Finding State Action in Investigative Consumer Reports
An analysis of the involvement of state and local government in
credit investigations leads to the conclusion that the requirements of
significant state involvement are satisfied.
a. Direct State Involvement
There is an exchange of information between the state and the
credit agencies. States and municipalities hire credit investigatory
companies to investigate prospective employees. 91 The states have
also used the agencies to discourage welfare fraud. 92  The exchange
of information goes in both directions. In many cities police depart-
ments make their records available to consumer reporting agencies
with or without charge. 193 Similarly, Retail Credit Company encour-
teenth Amendment by terminating service without a hearing. Rather than using the
"sum of the various indicia" test for state action, he considered seriatim each factor of
state involvement and rejected each individually as being insufficient. This case repre-
sents a rejection of state regulation and of public function as bases for finding state ac-
tion. The utility company was heavily regulated by the state. In addition, it enjoyed
a partial monopoly in providing essential public services. Nevertheless, the Court found
that neither of these factors was a sufficient indication of state involvement for pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is possible that an action based on invasion of privacy by a credit reporting
agency is distinguishable from Jackson. A symbiotic relationship such as the one be-
tween government and credit reporting agencies, as evidenced by an extensive exchange
of information, was neither present nor discussed in the Jackson case. The fact that
government benefits from and participates in the activities of the reporting agencies
could very well be a decisive factor in finding state action, especially in light of growing
public concern over loss of individual privacy in today's technological society.
191. Interview (telephone) with Lee Lester, Attorney for Retail Credit Co., Nov.
22, 1974. For example, the City of Miami hired Retail Credit Co. to investigate retired
city employees regarding claims for disability benefits. Miami News v. City of Miami,
Civ. No. 74-12503 (11th Jud. Cir., Dade County, Fla., filed May 3, 1974).
192. In Cincinnati, Ohio, a welfare agency gave Retail Credit Co. a list of its
hardest-to-find absent welfare fathers. The firm's investigators located 30 percent of
the missing men. The Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1972, at 1, col. 5. After a state
representative charged that erroneous and fraudulent welfare payments were totaling $23
million, Florida launched a crash program of interviewing all welfare cases. The Miamf
Herald, Jan. 21, 1972, at 8-C. When the state determined it could not handle the in-
creased work load, it hired Hooper Holmes, a consumer reporting agency, to investigate
all welfare applicants, The Miami Herald, Nov. 25, 1971, at 1-B.
193. The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 27, 1971, at 9, col. 5. Some of the nation's larg-
est detective agencies and Retail Credit Co. were fined for paying policemen and other
New York City employees for confidential records and personnel information. The
Wall Street Journal, Feb. 22, 1971, at 7, col. 4. In Massachusetts several state police-
men were recently investigated for unlawful sale of criminal records to credit reporting
agencies. In response, investigative agencies mounted a campaign to obtain legal au-
thorization for access to such files. CoMrTER-woRTD, Mar. 20, 1974, at 1.
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ages its investigators to obtain the maximum amount of information
from state and local agencies.194
194. In an interoffice memorandum, investigators were urged to "[d]o all that is
possible to open closed Police and Traffic Record information sources in your territory."
The message emphasized the importance of such information: "[lit provides our custo-
mers with factual 'actionable' information; it should be furnished whenever possible."
Interoffice Memorandum (Police and Traffic Record Availability), from Retail Credit
Operating-Service Dept. to All Managers and Sub-offices, Nov. 24, 1970.
A five-page internal memorandum of Retail Credit's Los Angeles metropolitan of-
fice rated various local and state government agencies as to their degree of cooperation:
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
(1) Central Receiving Hospital: "Of value in securing records of Emergency
Treatment. . . . POLICE & FIREMAN'S CLINIC is located here, of value on health
problems of those employees who get most of their treatment here, plus annual physical
examinations, etc."
(2) Los Angeles Police Department: "[W]e can purchase TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
REPORTS, DEATH REPORTS, AND CRIME REPORTS for $2.00 each.
"Under a new set-up... we may personally interview arresting officers on certain
type cases. Of particular value on Claim Cases of all types."
(3) Department of Missing Persons: "In [sic] the Los Angeles Police Department
will cooperate on Disappearance cases."
Regarding other city departments, the memorandum stated, "Almost all departments
are cooperative to a certain degree."
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
(1) Coroner's Office: "Full record review is available on questionable or acci-
dental deaths. We may look at or purchase'almost any document needed."
(2) Assessor's Records: "Here are the entire County Tax Rolls for Property Tax;
property ownership can be determined, lien-holders and tax-liens. Of particular value
on Subrogation type loss-claims, or on location problems."
(3) Criminal Court Records: "Full review of any record is possible. Of particular
value in pinning down derogatory information and getting exact details on Criminal Ac-
tivities. Records often include a Probation Officer's Report which will give full back-
ground, marital picture, employment picture, past arrests."
(4) Civil Court Records: "We can pull files and personally review them...."
(5) Probate Court Records: "On deceased persons we may pull file-gives good
run-down on financial picture, business background, heirs, etc."
(6) Psychiatric Commitments: Los Angeles General Hospital: "We can . . . get
all details of Psychiatric commitments by the Court."
(7) Sheriffs Department: "Various departments here are fairly cooperative, with
Homicide Detail the most cooperative. We may personally review their Death Reports
and Z-Files (Investigation Reports)."
Other county resources include: New Hall of Records (Birth and Death Certifi-
cates), County Health Department, Los Angeles General Hospital, Probation Depart-
ment and Voter's Registrar.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
(1) Highway Patrol: 'Traffic Accident Records . . . are available at all Branch
Units .... These may be picked up . . . or we can order them by letter for $2.00
each.
(2) Industrial Accident Commission: "These records cover those persons injured
on the job whose claims are disputed by an employer or compensation carrier. We can
personally pull the file and review it, can photostat the record, or order copies."
(3) Office of Administrative Procedures and Department of Vocational Standards:
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b. Indirect State Involvement
State regulation of the credit investigative agencies may be a sec-
ond basis for finding state action. Prior to the passage of the FCRA
only one state had passed regulatory legislation for credit bureaus.,'
Several states regulated investigations by private detective agencies,
but most exempted agencies investigating applicants for credit or in-
surance.' Several of these states restrict the exemption to investiga-
tions of the personal habits and financial or credit responsibility of ap-
plicants for insurance or commercial credit. If the agency participates
in other activities proscribed by the act, it will be treated as a detective
agency.' Since the passage of the FCRA, however, several states
have supplemented its provisions with their own regulatory legisla-
tion.19 8 In other states, regulation of insurance companies 9 ' may im-
part state action to those companies. Since an investigatory agency is
generally considered to be an agent of its client 00 this would be suffi-
cient to bring it with the ambit of state regulation. 20'
"These two offices maintain records on all licensed vocations .... We can check with
this Department for licenses, disciplinary problems, etc."
(4) Corporation Commission: "We can pull the file, and get a full run-down on
listed officers, number of shares issued (and value), plus other details on the busi-
ness."
(5) Department of Mental Hygiene: "Have records on those people registered as
having had Mental Hygiene problems, commitments to sanitariums, or mental hospitals.
Normally fairly cooperative, will furnish some details without a medical release, but full
details are available with a release."
Other State resources include: Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Appel-
late Courts, State Board of Equalization, Motor Vehicle Department, Division of Pa-
roles, Department of Public Health, Public Utilities Commission, State Athletic Com-
mission, and "many other departments which are very cooperative, but too numerous to
list." From Record Sources Available in the Los Angeles Civic Center Area, on file with
David Weinberger, West Miami, Florida.
195. OrLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 81-85 (1955).
196. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2110 (5) (Supp. 1973); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 7522(c) (West 1964); IND. CODE § 25-30-1-5(2) (1974); PA. SrT. ANN. tit. 22, §
25 (1955).
197. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 70(3) (McKinney 1968); Px. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 25 (1955).
198. For a full discussion of state legislation, see text accompanying notes 249-73
infra.
199. State insurance regulations control many areas of the insurance industry, in-
cluding premium rates, commissions, investments, appointment of agents, and marketing
practices and arrangements. See, e.g., R. KEETON, INsuRANCE Lmv § 8.3 (1971).
200. Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus Before the Subcomm. on Invasion of
Privacy of the Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong.. 2d Sess., at 20-22
[testimony of Alan Westin, Professor of Public Law and Government, Columbia Uni-
versity]; id. at 108 [testimony of John L. Spafford, executive vice president, Associated
Credit Bureaus] (1968).
201. The Supreme Court has approved the theory that a private organization can
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c. Other Theories for Finding State Action
It might also be argued that the failure of states to regulate activi-
ties of credit investigating agencies lends sufficient state authorization
to those activities to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. A number
of courts have held that a state's refusal to exercise its authority to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of individuals amounts to state action.20 2
This analysis has been taken one step further to suggest that failure
to pass and enforce regulatory legislation to limit consumer reporting
agencies whose practices invade individuals' constitutional rights like-
wise constitutes state action.2 0 3  A finding of state action could also
be based on the pervasiveness of the credit investigating agencies'
activities. 0 4
3. Finding Federal Action in Investigative Consumer Reports
The involvement of the federal government in credit investiga-
tions likewise is sufficiently extensive to support a finding of govern-
mental action violating the Bill of Rights.
a. Direct Federal Involvement
The exchange of information that exists at the state level is
equally pervasive at the federal level. Prior to the enactment of the
FCRA, use of credit investigative reports was extensive.20 5 Since the
be an agent of the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g., Amalga-
mated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 319-20
(1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,
469 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 663 (1944).
202. Lynch v. U.S., 189 F.2d 476, 479-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831
(1951); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 151 F.2d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. de-
nied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); Catlette v. U.S., 132 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943).
203. See Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NoRnm DAME LAw. 303
(1959).
204. According to one commentator, "the existence of sufficient economic power
concentrated in this vehicle to invade the constitutional right of an individual to a ma-
terial degree" will subject a state-created corporation to the same constitutional limita-
tions as those placed upon a governmental entity. Berle, Constitutional Limitations on
Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 943 (1952).
205. "Another area of interest to this committee .. .is the relationship between
Retail Credit Co. and various executive departments and agencies of the U.S. govern-
ment. A number of agencies, such as the Agency for International Development, Civil
Service Commission, Federal Housing Administration, and Veterans' Administration,
have established arrangements with our company substantially like those which we have
.. .with our nongovernment customers.
They relate to a business-type transaction which involves directly or indirectly the
commitment of Government funds or credit or, in some instances, the investigation of
prospective employees. In addition, Retail Credit Co. for many years has cooperated
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passage of the FCRA, use of investigative agencies has declined to
some extent206 due to provisions restricting permissible purposes for
which such reports can be used.20 7  However, their use has by no
means been discontinued. The Justice Department continues to obtain
credit reports for employment purposes. 20  The Civil Service Commis-
sion which investigates prospective employees for Atomic Energy Com-
mission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Peace Corps,
United States Information Agency and United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, routinely checks with credit bureaus in most
cases. 209  The Federal Housing Administration makes extensive use of
credit reports in granting mortgage insurance,210 as does the Veterans'
Administration in processing G.I. loan applications. 211  The Veterans'
Administration also uses investigative credit bureaus to locate G.I.s
who were overpaid while in the service or while attending school.212
A number of agencies are required by statute to consider an applicant's
financial responsibility. 213 This information usually is obtained from
with such investigative agencies of the U.S. Government as the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the Internal Revenue Service by making available to authorized repre-
sentatives of such agencies information which may be in our files." Retail Credit Hear-
ings, supra note 56, at 22-23 (testimony of W. Lee Burge, president, Retail Credit Co.).
The Treasury Department disclosed that its Internal Revenue Service agents use ap-
proximately 25,000 credit reports a year. These reports "save man' hours of investiga-
tive effort in locating and identifying persons and providing leads to financial transac-
tions that are relevant and material to tax inquiries." The Wall Street Journal, Apr.
13, 1970, at 21, col. 2.
206. Foer, supra note 58, at 76.
207. The FCRA specifies the purposes for which a consumer report may be fur-
nished to a governmental unit. The permissible purposes requirement is satisfied if the
information is to be used:
(1) in connection with an application for credit, employment or insurance;
(2) to determine his eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a gov-
ernmental instrumentality required by law to consider the applicant's financial
status; or
(3) for an otherwise legitimate business need.
A credit report may also be furnished to a governmental body in response to a court
order, or in accordance with the written instructions of the consumer. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681b and f (1970).
208. Letter from Ralph Erickson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Coun-
sel, Department of Justice, to Albert Foer, Mar. 21, 1972, in Foer, supra note 58, at
126-28.
209. Interview with Charles Rice, assistant chief-Investigative Division, San Fran-
cisco Regional Office, United States Civil Service Commission, in San Francisco, Nov.
27, 1974.
210. Letter from R. David Lasure, Director, Management & Operations, Assistance
Division of FHA, to Albert Foer, Jan. 14, 1972, in Foer, supra note 58, at 122-23.
211. Letter from Howard Denney, Assistant General Counsel for the Veterans' Ad-
ministration, to Albert Foer, Feb. 17, 1972, in Foer, supra note 58, at 124-25.
212. 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 26.
213. E.g., Export-Import Bank of Washington (12 U.S.C. §§ 635 et seq. (1970)];
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credit agencies. Again the exchange of information goes in both direc-
tions with credit investigative agencies making extensive use of federal
sources of information. 21 4
b. Indirect Federal Involvement
1. Regulation of Industry
The FCRA itself constitutes extensive federal regulation of the
credit investigating industry, limiting the purposes for which the infor-
mation can be gathered and persons to whom the information can be
sold. It also provides that the consumer must be notified of any ad-
verse action taken on the basis of reports and be given an opportunity
to correct any mistaken information. In effect, it extends government
approval of privacy-invading activities of such agencies.
2. Authorization of Investigatory Activities
Section 1681h(e) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act denies the
consumer the right to"
[B]ring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, inva-
sion of privacy, or negligence with respect to -the reporting of infor-
mation against any consumer reporting agency, any user of informa-
tion, or any person who furnishes information to a consumer report-
ing agency . . . except as to false information furnished with
malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.
The effect of this provision is to suspend the consumer's fundamental
constitutional right of privacy as it relates to such investigatory re-
ports.215 To deny the consumer a remedy for invasion of his right of
Federal Home Loan Banks Board [12 U.S.C. §§ 1424 et seq., § 1701c(c) (1970)];
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 et seq. (1970)1; Department
of Interior (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service) [16 U.S.C. §§ 742A et seq. (1970)]; Depart-
ment of State (Agency for International Development) [22 U.S.C. §§ 2151 et seq.
1970)]; Veterans' Administration [38 U.S.C. §§ 210 et seq. (1970)]; Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (Public Health Service) [42 U.S.C. §§ 294 et seq.
(1970)].
214. A five-page internal memorandum of Retail Credit's Los Angeles metropolitan
office rated various federal agencies as to their degree of cooperation with investigators:
(1) Bankruptcy Records: "Entire file may be pulled and examined. Portions
may be purchased. They are of particular value in pinning down financial dif-
ficulty, running down creditors and of use in business background.
(2) Criminal Records: "Of use in confirming Criminal Activities on Location
cases.
(3) Veterans' Administration: "With proper medical authorization, we may
review full medical files. .. ."
The memorandum concludes: "Various sources within the Federal Government are co-
operative, such as the State Department, and other agencies. Others are not, such as
the FBI and Treasury Department." From Record Sources Available in the Los Angeles
Civic Center Area, on file with David Weinberger, West Miami, Fla.
215. See generally Comment, Fair Credit Reporting Act: Constitutional Defects of
the Limitation of Liability Clause, 11 HousT. L. REv. 424 (1974).
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privacy is to stamp the activity with a seal of governmental approval.
Such approval can only encourage the investigatory practices that lead
to invasions of privacy.
In the "open housing" case, Reitman v. Mulkey,-"6 the Court up-
held a finding of state action based on an amendment to the California
constitution which prohibited government restriction of the right of pri-
vate citizens to convey real property. The Court found that the
amendment would significantly encourage and involve the state in pri-
vate discrimination contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. "Here we
are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law
forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to
authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing mar-
ket.' '117 The provisions in the FCRA denying a remedy for invasion
of privacy similarly authorizes and encourages actions violating the
Constitution of the United States.
c. Delegation of Duties
The delegation of activities from governmental to private bodies
can, under some circumstances, convert the private body into an instru-
mentality of the government, and subject it to the same constitutional
limitations. 218  Investigations of prospective employees and applicants
for licenses, loans and other governmental benefits, clearly come within
this definition.
3. Alternative to Finding Government Action: 18 U.S.C § 241
Even in the absence of a finding of state action, 18 U.S.C. section
241219 presents a possible alternate means of preventing privacy-in-
vading activities by consumer credit reporting agencies. The Court has
yet to recognize congressional power to legislate against any and all pri-
vate conspiracies to interfere with the constitutional rights of others.
Nevertheless, Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce justifies
the extension of section 241 penalties to invasion of the constitutional
right of privacy by consumer credit reporting agencies. 220  Although
216. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
217. Id. at 380-81.
218. The Supreme Court has adopted this position in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 299 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953).
219. 18 U.S.C. § 241 reads in part: "If two or more persons conspire to injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because
of his having so exercised the same ... [tihey shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. .. "
220. Cf. United States v, Quest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (federal commerce power
[Vol. 2
the original intent of the statute was to protect the black population
of the South against outrages committed by the Ku Klux Klan, its
scope has been greatly enlarged.221  Several cases have held that sec-
tion 241 protects all rights granted under the Constitution of the United
States222 regardless of whether the particular mode of injury for which
the defendant is indicted was known at the time of the adoption of the
statute.2 2 3  It is not necessary that the right in question be specifically
mentioned in the Constitution; the conspiracy statute applies with equal
force to implicit constitutional rights. 24
The power of Congress to enact legislation to protect individual
liberties guaranteed by the federal Constitution from interference by
private conspiracies has been upheld in a number of cases." 5 Thus
it is unnecessary to allege actions under color of state law for purposes
of applying section 241. It is essential, however, that the requisite spe-
cific intent be satisfied. Under section 241 proof that the actors ac-
tually knew it was a constitutional right they were conspiring against
is not necessary. It must be established, however, that the acts which
violate constitutional rights were the primary purpose of the conspiracy,
rather than an incidental side effect.2 6
Under section 241 there must be a finding of conspiracy to de-
prive a citizen of his constitutional rights. Conspiracy has been defined
as a combination of two or more persons for an unlawful purpose or
supports the extension of section 241 to protect freedom of interstate travel against in-
terference by private conspiracies).
221. In United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915), Mr. Justice Holmes com-
mented on section 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 141, as amended, now
18 U.S.C. § 241: "Just as the Fourteenth Amendment . . . was adopted with a view
to the protection of the colored race but has been found to be equally important in its
application to the rights of all, [section 241] had a general scope and used general words
that have become the most important now that the Ku Klux have passed away ....
[W]e cannot allow the past so far to affect the present as to deprive citizens of the
United States of the general protection which on its face [the statute] most reasonably
affords." 238 U.S. at 388.
222. United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968); United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
223. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
224. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263
(1892); United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1974).
225. E.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (private interference in
right to freedom of interstate travel); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)
(private interference in federal primaries); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) (right
to inform federal officials of violations of federal laws); Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263 (1892) (conspiracy to injure someone in the custody of a United States mar-
shall); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884) (statutory right to make home-
stead upon unoccupied public lands); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (right
to be free from private interference in federal elections).
226, United States v. Ques4 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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to effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means. A combination requires
that the parties have reached agreement. Agreement need not be for-
mal, however; it is enough that the parties tacitly come to an under-
standing in regard to the unlawful purpose. This may be inferred
from sufficiently significant circumstances. Unlawful, includes what-
ever is punishable as an offense by statute or at common law.22T The
agreement between a consumer reporting agency and the user of the
report satisfies the definition of conspiracy. A combination between
the credit reporting agency and the user is demonstrated by the stand-
ard investigation forms used by the largest consumer reporting agen-
cies22s during investigations of applicants for life, automobile and acci-
dent and health insurance. Each form requests information as to the
applicant's character or reputation. Specifically they request the in-
vestigator to give details of any evidence that any of the following apply
to the applicant: heavy debts, domestic trouble, drug habit, irregular
beneficiary, illegal activities, questionable business practices. Every
form has a catchall question as to any criticism of applicant's character,
morals or associates.2 9 Additionally, some consumer reporting agen-
cies require their investigators to meet production quotas for protective
and declinable information.2 0 In Retail Credit's Manager's Manual,
protective information is referred to as "the 'meat' of the report-the
basis upon which we sell our service. '231  That insurance companies
agree with this assessment is apparent from the fact that they award their
contracts to the company developing the highest percentage of adverse
information. 32 Likewise, the requirement that the actors combine to
effect an unlawful purpose is satisfied by intent to invade the privacy
of the home.
C. Summary
In summary, it can be seen that investigative consumer reports are
an invasion of the individual's constitutional right of privacy and often
result in actual harm. The right of privacy outweighs the need for
such information when competing interests are balanced against each
other. Additionally, there are less restrictive and more reliable alter-
natives for gathering the information needed. The requirement of
227. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRimiNAL LAW 629 (2d ed. 1969).
228. The largest national insurance inspection bureaus include American Service
Bureau, Hooper-Holmes Bureau, National Inspection Bureau (O'Hanlon's Reports),
Retail Credit Company and Service Review. Foer, supra note 58, at 51.
229. 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 4, at 839-72.
230. See generally, 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19.
231. 1973 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 4, at 973.
232. 1974 Proxmire Hearings, supra note 19, at 18.
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government action is satisfied by reason of the involvement of govern-
ment in investigative consumer reporting. Additionally, 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 241 provides a possible remedy for the consumer when his consti-
tutional right of privacy has been invaded by investigative consumer
reports.
m. Legislative Remedies
Until recently, personal information data banks were allowed to
grow unchecked. As their potential for harm has become apparent,
they have become a source of international concern. Legislation deal-
ing with personal information data banks has been enacted in Swe-
den,23  Canada234 and Australia.2 33  Recently an international sym-
posium, sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, considered the problems created by personal informa-
tion data banks. 36  In the United States, concern for the potential dan-
gers of personal information systems developed around 1960.
233. The Swedish Data Act provides that a personal register may not be started or
maintained without permission of the Data Inspection Board. Such permission shall be
granted only if there would be no undue invasion of the privacy of individuals. It also
specifies that permission to keep certain types of information (criminal record, treatment
for mental condition, state of health, receipt of social assistance, treatment for alcohol-
ism, political or religious views) shall not be granted except under special circumstances.
See Hearings on Federal Information Systems and Plans-Implications and Issues Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
3, at 1095-1102 (1974).
234. Canada has responded to the growth of the consumer reporting industry with
strong legislation regulating how such information may be obtained, maintained and
used. Five provinces-Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, Ontario and British Co-
lumbia-have passed legislation regarding credit reporting agencies. Quebec is consider-
ing similar legislation.
Ontario's Consumer Reporting Act (The Consumer Reporting Act of 1973, ONT.
REG. 251/74 (Can.)), like those of other provinces, distinguishes between credit agen-
cies which report bill-paying records, and credit reporting agencies which investigate the
consumer's character for insurance companies and employers. The act requires per-
sonal information investigators to register. It gives consumers the right to inspect their
files and to correct inaccuracies. It forbids files to be kept for more than seven years,
and bans data on race, color, sex, creed, ancestry or origin. Consumers must be notified
in advance if a report is requested and, if adverse action is taken on the basis of a report,
they must be told the source of the information. The act imposes a maximum fine of
$2,000 on individuals and $25,000 on corporations for furnishing false information.
235. In Queensland, Australia, the Invasion of Privacy Act of 1971 limits credit
reporting agents to a moderate extent. The strongest provision requires credit reporting
agents to apply for a license and go through a stringent screening process. The license
must be renewed every year and is subject to cancellation for various reasons. See
generally Whalan, The Creditor-Granting Aspects of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971, 7
U. QuEENSLANDL.J. 428 (1972).
236. A summary statement was drafted to guide governments considering privacy
legislation. It recommended:
(1) Standards for the operations of personal registers should be established,
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Congressional concern over the credit reporting industry culmi-
nated in the passage of the FCRA, which went into effect in 1971.
Since that time, a number of states have supplemented its provisions
with legislation of their own. In addition, Congress has considered a
number of proposed amendments to the FCRA as well as legislation
dealing with other privacy issues.
A. Federal Legislation: FCRA and Proposed Amendments
The FCRA was enacted "to insure that consumer reporting agen-
cies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and
a respect for the consumer's right to privacy.' 23 7 The act requires con-
sumer reporting agencies to adopt reasonable procedures to ensure the
confidentiality, accuracy and the proper use of such information.23
The chief requirements which the act places on consumer report-
ing agencies and the users of the reports follow.
1. Accuracy of Information
The consumer reporting agencies must follow reasonable pro-
cedures in preparing their reports to assure maximum possible accuracy
of the information. 239
2. Permissible Purposes
A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report
about an individual only: (a) in response to a court order; (b) in re-
sponse to the written instructions by the individual to whom it relates;
(c) in order to determine the individual's eligibility for credit, in-
surance or employment; (d) for a license or other benefit granted by
a governmental instrumentality which is required by law to consider
the applicant's financial responsibility; and (e) to meet a legitimate busi-
ness need for a business transaction involving the individual.240 A con-
sumer reporting agency must take steps to ensure that its reports will
be used only for permissible purposes.241
following assessment of likely developments with adequate protection for indi-
vidual privacy.
(2) Each citizen should have the right to inspect information about him in all
public and private records and to correct or challenge incorrect data.
(3) Nations should co-operate to harmonize minimum protective standards,
and should use great care in implementing programs involving data collected
on all citizens. 106 SCMNcE NEws No. 19, Nov. 9, 1974, at 296.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (1970).
238. Id. § 1681(b).
239. Id. § 1681e(b).
240. Id. § 1681b. Government agencies, however, can obtain identifying informa-
tion (name, address and places of employment) for nonbusiness uses. Id. § 1681f.
241. Id. § 1681e(a).
[Vol. 2
L=ITLE BROTHER
3. Notice to Individuals
Whenever adverse action is taken, wholly or partly because of
information in a consumer report, the user of the report must notify
the individual and furnish him with the name and address of the con-
sumer reporting agency. Adverse action is defined as the denial of
credit, insurance or employment, or the increasing of charges for credit
or insurance. 242
Whenever a consumer reporting agency includes in its report
public information which may have an adverse effect, it must so notify
the individual, and furnish him with the name and address of the person
to whom the information is to be supplied, or, in the alternative, it must
maintain strict procedures designed to ensure that whenever public rec-
ord information is used, it is complete and up-to-date.243 Whenever an
investigative report, obtained through personal interviews with neigh-
bors or acquaintances, is to be prepared, the individual must be noti-
fied in advance unless the report is for employment for which the indi-
vidual has not applied.244
4. Individual Right of Access
The individual has a right to be clearly, accurately and fully in-
formed of the nature and substance of all information in the consumer
reporting agency's file excepting medical information and the sources
of an investigative consumer report. He also has a right to be informed
of all persons who received a copy of such report within the two prior
years for employment purposes, and within the last six months for any
other permissible purpose.2,4 5
5. Right to Contest Information
If the accuracy or the completeness of the information is dis-
puted, the consumer reporting agency must reinvestigate and record
the current status of that information. It must delete the information
if it is found to be inaccurate or cannot be verified. If reinvestigation
does not resolve the dispute, the individual has the right to file a brief
statement, which can be limited to 100 words, explaining the dispute.
Unless there are reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be
frivolous or irrelevant the agency must thereafter note the dispute and
provide at least a clear summary of the individual's statement. 46
242. Id. § 1681m.
243. Id. § 1681k.
244. Id. § 1681d(a).
245. Id. § 1681g.
246. Id. § 1681i.
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While the FCRA has provided consumers with some protection,
it nevertheless suffers from a number of shortcomings. After three
years of administering the act, the FTC concluded that it is an ineffec-
tive tool for achieving desired goals. The commission proposed a
sweeping revision 47 which has been incorporated into Senate Bill 2360.
Although these amendments have been tabled by committee, they are
important as an indication of those weaknesses of the FCRA most likely
to be corrected. The amendments would:
(1) require the user to disclose the reason for the adverse
action;
(2) require the user to provide the consumer with a copy of
the report relied upon;
(3) permit a personal, visual inspection of the file and grant
the consumer the right to a copy;
(4) require consumer authorization before an investigative
consumer report can be made;
(5) broaden the definition of consumer reporting agency to
include governmental agencies which prepare investiga-
tive reports for other agencies or subdivisions of the gov-
ernment, such as the Civil Service Commission;
(6) repeal section 1681h(e), which denies a consumer a
right of action for defamation, invasion of privacy or
negligence except in cases of willful or negligent non-
compliance;
(7) require that a consumer report be in writing, that the
sources of all information be identified, and that the file
be retained by the consumer reporting agency for at least
one year;
(8) impose minimum punitive damages of $1000 for willful
noncompliance, and minimum actual damages of $100
for each item of erroneous information in cases of negli-
gent noncompliance;
(9) give the FTC rulemaking authority.24
Although the amendments to the FCRA would substantially
strengthen the protection to the consumer, important gaps would still
exist. Most importantly, the FCRA, as amended, would continue to
protect only the accuracy of the report and would place no limits on
the type of information that could be gathered and sold. The only way
that an applicant could avoid investigations of a higly personal nature
would be to forego the benefit for which he is applying. A second
247. See Feldman, The Fair Credit Reporting Act-From the Regulators Vantage
Point, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 458, 470 (1974).
248. S. 2360, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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weakness is that the consumer has no control over the dissemination
of his file after giving his permission for an investigation. After the
consumer reporting agency completes a file, it is regarded as the
agency's property to be disseminated to anyone who desires it for a
permissible purpose. Finally, the amendments do not deal with the
problems created by the use of public record information.
B. State Legislation
As of March, 1974, thirteen states had passed credit reporting
legislation to supplement the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. 249
Among the provisions of these laws are several significant measures for
dealing with the abuses of investigative consumer reports. Generally
these provisions fall into four categories: information which is con-
veyed to the subject of the report, information which is included or ex-
cluded from these reports, uses to which the reports can be put, and
penalties for violations of the law.
1. Information Disclosed to the Subject
The most effective means so far provided by legislation to curb
the abuses of investigative consumer reports has been to require dis-
closure of all sources of information. Arizona requires that the names
of all sources of information be furnished the consumer upon request. 250
Retail Credit has adamantly fought this provision, saying it would cut off
their confidential sources of information.2 51 The legislators who have
considered this argument in congressional hearings have consistently
maintained that information from an anonymous source is not of suffi-
cient reliability to be included in credit reports.252
Another important provision regarding disclosure is the require-
ment that the actual contents of the report be shown to the subject.
Although the FCRA stops short of this, at least four states require dis-
closure of the contents. 3 One state requires that any opinion on
financial or credit rating be mailed to the subject before being given
to a retailer.2 5
4
249. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, C & SC. Charts § 680, at 2909-16 (1973).
250. Asxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1693(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
251. Retail Credit Hearings, supra note 56, at 13 (testimony of W. Lee Burge, presi-
dent, Retail Credit Co.).
252. See generally id. at 3-46.
253. Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1693(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 93, § 56 (1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 359-B:9(II) (Supp. 1973);
N.H. STAT. ANN. § 50-18-2(B) (Supp. 1973).
254. OKrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 82 (1955).
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2. Information Which is Included or Excluded
Several states have placed certain restrictions on the allowable in-
formation. Kentucky law provides that no consumer reporting agency
may maintain any information relating to a criminal charge in a Ken-
tucky court which has not resulted in a conviction." 5  New Mexico
provides that any criminal record must be deleted immediately upon
pardon or failure to convict.25 6
Several states have offered safeguards regarding disputed and in-
accurate information. Arizona requires that upon receiving written no-
tice of an inaccuracy, the consumer reporting agency has fifteen days
to admit, deny the inaccuracy or to state it has not had sufficient time
to complete the investigation. If the inaccuracy is admitted or unveri-
fied, the agency must correct its files as claimed by the consumer and
notify any person to whom the item was reported.2 " The Connecticut
Consumer Credit Reports Law states that a credit rating agency must
correct any misinformation contained in its files upon satisfactory pres-
entation of proof of error.2 8  New Mexico requires a credit bureau to
give the consumer forms upon which to designate errors. 259 This law
also requires the bureau to make any necessary reinvestigation, updating
and correcting at no cost to the consumer if he or she has been denied
credit as a result of a report.260  Florida prohibits a collection agency
from disclosing information about the existence of a disputed debt
without also disclosing the fact of the dispute. Additionally, the debtor
must be informed that the dispute will be noted in the report.261 Okla-
homa requires that the credit agency attempt to obtain from the sub-
ject a statement of his assets and liabilities.20 2
3. Permissible Uses
A more indirect method of protecting the consumer is to regulate
the permissible uses of investigative consumer reports. The FCRA
limits the permissible uses to "legitimate business needs." Several
states limit uses further. New Mexico requires credit bureaus to make
service contracts in which the user certifies that inquiries be made only
for proper purposes. Bureaus must refuse service to anyone who will
255. Ch. 119 [1974] Ky. Acts 224.
256. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-18-6(A) (5) (Supp. 1973).
257. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1694 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
258. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-432(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
259. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-18-2(E) (Supp. 1973).
260. Id. § 50-18-2(C).
261. FLA. STAT. § 559.72 (3) & (6) (Cum. Supp. 1975). See also MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 93, § 58 (1972).
262. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 81 (1955).
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not so certify and discontinue service for failure to honor a contract. 63
Additionally New Mexico requires credit bureaus which furnish per-
sonnel reporting services to adopt rigid safeguards to keep separate all
specialized information other than credit information. Such informa-
tion may not be incorporated in credit reports or furnished except in
connection with personnel investigation. 264 Florida law prohibits col-
lection agencies from publishing deadbeat lists.2 65 New York law
requires written authorization by the subject before a report can
be furnished to anyone other than the subject, a creditor, law enforce-
ment agency, licensing agency, another credit bureau or upon court
order. This statute also delineates the permissible purposes for which
the report can be used. A creditor or credit bureau may use a report
only for the purpose of extending credit, reviewing accounts or collect-
ing delinquent accounts. A licensing agency may use a report only for
considering financial status or responsibility. A law enforcement
agency is limited to use for law enforcement purposes or national se-
curity.20 6
4. Penalties
A fourth legislative approach to protecting the consumer is to give
him or her a specific means of enforcement. Several states specify civil
liabilities for certain violations. 26 7  These liabilities are important to
overcome the conditional privilege often granted credit reports. Sev-
eral states specify, damage amounts. 268 Additionally, several states
provide criminal penalties for violation of fair credit reporting. 69
5. Pending Legislation
New legislation on credit reporting is being considered in numer-
ous state legislatures. In December, 1973, a list of bills which had
been introduced in state legislatures was submitted to the Senate Sub-
committee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, listing
forty-five bills in twenty-five states.27 ° In six states study commissions
263. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-18-4 (Supp. 1973).
264. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-18-5 (Supp. 1973).
265. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(14) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
266. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw. § 373(1) & (2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
267. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1695(C) (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-18-7 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 83 (1955).
268. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1747.70 (West 1971); N.Y. GEN. Bus.' LAW § 376(1)
(McKimney Supp. 1973).
269. Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1696 (Cum. Supp. 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 36-435 (Cum. Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-720 (Cum. Supp. 1973);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-18-8 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 376(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1974); TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. art. 9016(2) & (3) (Cam. Supp. 1974).
270. Hearings on Federal Information Systems and Plans-Implications and Issues,
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were proposed. 7 1  Two state legislatures were considering active
"right of privacy commissions" to deal with invasions of that right.2 7 2
In Maryland, a bill was introduced to state that the right of privacy shall
not be abridged without due process. 27'
C. Proposal
1. Prohibited Information
Information which invades a person's "sphere of privacy" should
never be collected, recorded, filed, sold or used as a basis for making
decisions concerning that person. This idea is simply the fruition of
the conceptual theory first enunciated by Warren and Brandeis, re-
iterated by Bloustein and followed by Griswold-namely the preserva-
tion of human dignity. Legislation applying this theory to investigative
credit reports, as well as to all personal information systems, is neces-
sary to protect the individual's constitutionally recognized right to pri-
vacy in the modem world of data files and computers.
The first legislative principle, therefore, must be to prohibit cer-
tain information from being gathered, recorded or entered into files.-74
Guidelines for defining prohibited information follow. The first four
deal with specific information which must be strictly prohibited.
a) Any direct or indirect indication of race, color, ethnic
background or racial heritage. Since such information is often
gleaned from other facts, any references to type of neighbor-
hood or type of associates of the subject should be prohibited.
This guideline is consistent with the government policy of
equal rights.2 7
5
Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 830-31 (1974).
271. Alaska (HCR 44); Illinois (H743); New Jersey (SCR 12); Ohio (SR 199);
Texas (HSR 158); Vermont (JRS 17).
272. Illinois (H468) and Massachusetts (111417).
273. Md. H150. For a summary of proposed legislation in California, see Note,
The California Consumer Reporting Agencies Act: A Proposed Improvement on the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 26 Hastings L.J. 1219 (1975). A local ordinance imposing
tight restrictions on consumer reporting was passed in Dade County, Florida (Dade
County, Fla., Ordinance Pertaining to Fair Investigative Consumer Reporting and Dis-
closure, No. 74-87, Oct. 15, 1974). Several provisions have been invalidated by a recent
decision. Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, Civ. No. 74-1104 (S.D. Fla., filed Mar. 31,
1975).
274. Alternatively, legislators could undertake to enumerate the specific types of in-
formation which could be allowed in investigative consumer reports and other personal
information systems.
275. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1971). "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
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b) Any reference to political or religious beliefs or activities.
This provision also carries out the policy of equal rights. An
identical provision has been included in the federal Privacy
Act of 1974.276
c) Any reference to arrest, indictment or civil litigation
which has not resulted in conviction or judgment against the
subject. Information on less than a final disposition must be
updated each time it is used. This principle is presently in-
cluded in the credit reporting laws of Kentucky2 77 and New
Mexico. 8 In a modified form, it is incorporated in National
Criminal Information Center legislation.2 79  It is also in-
eluded in the proposed Comprehensive Right to Privacy
Act.280
d) Any information from interviews with third persons other
than with persons named as references by the subject and
past employers. This provision attacks the hearsay and opin-
ion which is the basis for much of the harm caused by investi-
gative consumer reports.
The remaining guidelines should be used to evaluate all other informa-
tion in investigative consumer reports. Any data which fits into these
categories should also be strictly prohibited.
e) Any information which invades the privacy of the home
or of the person. This category would exclude all informa-
tion or reference to a person's family relationships, sexual re-
lationships, personal associations and activities, possessions,
habits, hobbies and weaknesses where there is no legitimate
business purpose for gathering such information. This pro-
vision codifies the ideas underlying Griswold.
f) All other irrelevant information, with the burden of proof
on defendant to demonstrate the relevance of the particular
piece of information to the purpose of the report. This cate-
gory would exclude otherwise permissible information which
has no bearing on the particular purpose of the report. Thus
the amount of stored information would be reduced, as would
the danger of obsolete information. It would also ensure
that only relevant considerations be applied to a particular
decision, thus keeping other biases of the decisionmakers from
creeping into the decisionmaking process.
276. Privacy Act of 1974, § 552a(e) (4), Put. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (Dec.
31, 1974).
277. Ch. 119 [1974] Ky. Acts 224.
278. N.M. STATS. ANN. § 50-18-6(A)(5) (Supp. 1973).
279. H.R. 15527, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S.3633, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
280. H.R. 15527, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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2. Safeguards
In light of the consumer reporting industry's resistance to limita-
tions on the gathering, use and dissemination of personal information,
any law which merely prohibits certain information from being re-
corded will be ineffective. The following minimum safeguards are es-
sential to ensure that prohibited information is excluded from consumer
files.
a) Right of consumer to physical access to his report and
to copy all information therein. Right to receive a copy of
report prior to dissemination. This provision is necessary to
ensure that the consumer can discover the exact contents of his
file and to determine whether or not prohibited information
appears in his report.251
b) Consent of the consumer prior to each release of the in-
formation in his file. Consent by the consumer to access by
one user cannot be regarded as consent to all subsequent re-
quests for information about him.
c) An accurate and complete record of all persons and or-
ganizations which have requested and received the file. This
listing should also record the purpose for which the informa-
tion was used.282
281. In an analogous area, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
grants parents and students over age 18 the right to inspect all official school records,
files and data directly related to the student. Pun. L. No. 93-380, § 2, 88 Stat. 571
(Aug. 21, 1974).
This was later amended, permitting schools to deny disclosure to students of medical
records, financial records of parents and recommendations pertaining to admission to an
educational institution, employment applications or the receipt of an honor received
prior to Jan. 1, 1975. PuB. L. No. 93-568, § 2(a)(3)(B), 88 Stat. 1855 (Dec. 31, 1974).
The Privacy Act of 1974 requires all federal agencies which maintain a system of
records to permit an individual to review any records pertaining to him and to have a
copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him. PuB. L. No.
93-579, § 2, 88 Stat. 1896 (Dec. 31, 1974).
Other databank legislation currently under consideration also would grant the right
to visually inspect files containing identifiable personal information. The Comprehen-
sive Privacy Act would grant a right of access to any files maintained by any federal,
state, local or territorial government, or by any public or private entity engaged in indus-
trial, commercial or other similar business. (H.R. 15527, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
A substantially similar Senate bill would apply only to federal, state and local govern-
mental agencies. S.3633, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
282. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act requires that such a record
be kept permanently in students' files. PuB. L. No. 93-380, § 513, 88 Stat. 571 (Aug.
21, 1974). The Privacy Act of 1974 contains a requirement that such a record be main-
tained for a period of five years or the life of the record, whichever is longer. PUB.
L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (Dec. 31, 1974). The Comprehensive Right to Privacy
Act [H.R. 15527, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)] and its sister bill, the Government Data
Bank Right to Privacy Act [S.3633, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)] propose similar re-
quirements.
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d) Segregation of information in the files according to pur-
pose. Certain kinds of information are relevant as to some
business transactions but irrelevant as to others. For ex-
ample, an insurance company is justified in requesting gen-
eral medical information for health or life insurance. The
same request would not be justified, however, in relation to an
application for credit. Similarly, a prospective employer is
justifiably interested in evaluations by previous employers as
to an applicant's effectiveness on the job, whereas such infor-
mation would have no relevance to an application for auto
insurance.
2 3
e) Minimum civil damages for each act of negligent non-
compliance plus minimum punitive damages for each act of
willful noncompliance. These minimum damages should not
be less than those provided in the proposed amendments to
the FCRA.28 4 Burden of proof must be on the agency to show
that its noncompliance was neither negligent nor willful.
These provisions are important to assure the consumer a
remedy when actual financial damage is slight or speculative.
Furthermore, such a provision would supply a monetary in-
centive for compliance.
f) Establishment of a federal privacy board to enforce com-
pliance with these provisions. A privacy board is necessary
to concentrate the attention of a single agency on the prob-
lems of privacy invasion by consumer reporting agencies.
This body could be organized within the FTC or as a separate
executive department.
While not exhaustive, these suggested safeguards are the mini-
mum necessary to protect the American consumer against invasions of
privacy by consumer reporting agencies.
Conclusion
It has been shown that investigative consumer reports constitute
an invasion of the constitutional right of privacy. This intrusion into
283. The Privacy Act of 1974 requires consent by the individual before any federal
agency can disclose personally identifiable records except for certain specified routine
purposes. Pu. L. No. 93-579 § 2 (Dec. 31, 1974). Proposed legislation would impose
similar restrictions. The Comprehensive Privacy Act [H.R. 15527, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974)] and the Government Data Bank Right to Privacy Act [S.3633, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974)] provide that personal information collected for one purpose should not
be used for another purpose without the consent of the individual.
284. The proposed amendments to the FCRA would set minimum damages of $100
for each item of erroneous information and $1000 for each act of willful noncompli-
ance. S.2360, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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personal privacy is not outweighed by the legitimate need for informa-
tion, since all necessary information can be obtained through less in-
trusive means.
Government involvement in credit investigations is sufficiently ex-
tensive to support a finding of governmental action on the local, state
and federal levels. The pervasiveness of government involvement be-
comes apparent from the aggregate of facts and circumstances: (1) the
mutuality of benefits reflected in the exchange of information between
credit bureaus and all levels of government; (2) the regulation of
credit investigations by local, state and federal governments; (3) the
public function aspect of credit bureau services; and (4) the authoriza-
tion of privacy-invading practices reflected in the denial of a remedy
to individuals injured by such investigations.
In the alternative, 18 U.S.C. section 241 provides a possible ve-
hicle for imposing criminal penalties on credit investigating agencies
for invasion on the constitutional right to privacy.
Judicial relief would be possible, therefore, where there is a show-
ing of actual harm. The appropriate remedy would include an injunc-
tion to prohibit further use of the investigative consumer report and
actual damages.
While some judicial relief is available to indihiduals who have
been harmed by investigative consumer reports, strong legislation is
necessary to proscribe these injuries. Present federal and state stat-
utes make a start towards curtailing the abuse of investigative reports,
but stronger regulation of the industry is needed. Information which
invades a person's sphere of privacy should be absolutely prohibited
from investigative consumer reports. Additionally, certain safeguards
must be enacted to assure the consumer access to his file, a means of
correcting false information and to keep information from being used
for improper purposes. A right of action for noncompliance should
be reserved to the consumer. General enforcement of privacy legisla-
tion should be entrusted to a separate entity which xill focus on safe-
guarding the individual's right of privacy.
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